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The Purpose of Insurance
Regulation:
A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law
The author of this Article ambitiously undertakes to ar-
ticulate those imperfectly perceived human aspirations
which, having given rise to the institution of insurance,
also give impetus to the regulation of that institution.
Professor Kimball begins with an examination of the in-
ternal structure of the insurance enterprise, first discuss-
ing the implications of the policy holder's basic need for
security and then considering the sometimes counter-
vailing demands for reasonable, fair, and equitable treat-
ment of policyholders. He then shifts his focus from struc-
ture to superstructure, from the essential to the expe-
dient. Here, we are led to appreciate the impact of gen-
eral public policies-political, economic, social, moral-
upon the institution of insurance. The author concludes
that it is difficult if not impossible to formulate a general
theory of insurance regulation and that such a formula-
tion may never be possible; although wve can isolate com-
mon goals, the multiplicity of possible paths to those
goals would seem to defy a definitive statement.
Spencer L. Kimball *
INTRODUCTION
In the past half century, both private and governmental insur-
ance have increased rapidly in importance in the western world.
Though the substantial origin of the modem insurance system is
found centuries ago in the economic renascence of Europe, it has
*Professor of Law, Umversity of Michigan. The research for this Arti-
cle was made possible by funds from the W.W. Cook Endowment and the
Ford Foundation Grant for International Legal Studies. Grateful acknowl-
edgement is made to both. Neither assumes any responsibility for the views
expressed here.
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come into its own only in the twentieth century. With the passing
of time, the institution has expanded from narrow beginnings in
maritime commerce to serve a wide variety of needs, many of them
not directly connected with economic activity In our day a variety
of insurance services is indispensable to commerce of any sort; it
is even difficult to find noneconomic activity of modern man
which has no insurance implications.'
The rapid recent growth of the insurance enterprise has been
accompanied by the elaboration of governmental machinery to
control the enterprise in the public interest. Meaningful regula-
tion is much newer than the insurance business. In the United
States it is scarcely a century old, and in most countries it is
younger. Its significant growth is still more recent, and can be
measured in a few decades, in even the most advanced parts of the
world.
Insurance regulation was not created full-blown, it evolved. Su-
pervision did not begin with the establishment of a board of in-
surance commissioners in New Hampshire in 1851,2 in Massachu-
setts and Vermont in 1852,' in Rhode Island in 1855,1 or with the
appointment of a single superintendent in New York in 1859,'
though it was by the creation of such independent regulatory agen-
cies that insurance regulation became effective and comprehen-
sive.' Some regulatory powers had existed for decades before the
1. I have summarized this development in KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY, ch. 2 (1960) Some statistics from INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE, [1960] LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK may serve to throw the
rapidity of growth into bolder relief. While the population doubled in the
half century from 1909 to 1959, from about 90 million to about 180 mil-
lion, ordinary life insurance in force in the United States increased from II
billion dollars to 316 billion dollars, id. at 23; group life insurance began
about 1912, and there was 160 billion dollars in force in 1959, id. at 25;
credit life insurance began about 1920, and there was 26 billion dollars
in force in 1959, id. at 30; in 1909 about three billion dollars of industrial
life insurance was in force, in 1959 nearly 40 billion dollars, id. at 28; an-
nual income of life companies increased from less than one billion dol-
lars in 1911 to nearly 22 billion dollars in 1959, id. at 51; and assets of
American life insurance companies increased from 3.6 billion dollars in
1909 to 113.6 billion dollars in 1959, id. at 62. Similar growth could be
shown in other long-established lines of insurance, not to speak of the enor-
mous size of lines scarcely known half a century ago, such as automobile
and disability
2. N. H. Laws 1851, ch. 1111.
3. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1852, ch. 231, Vt. Laws 1852, No. 45,
§ 15; Vt. Laws 1852, No. 46, § 16.
4. R. I. Laws 1854 (Oct. sess.), p. 17, § 17
5. N. Y Laws 1859, ch. 366, transferring to the superintendent powers
given the state comptroller by N. Y Laws 1849, ch. 308, §§ 7, 11, 13.
The New York department celebrated its hundredth anniversary in 1960.
See [1960] SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE, 101ST PRELIM. REPT. I1-
12.
6. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED
STATES 536 (1927)
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creation of these independent agencies. Thus in the 1820's both
New York and Massachusetts required certain insurance compa-
nies to make reports to the state comptroller or to the state treas-
urer.7 Even that was not the beginning. Before they assigned regu-
latory tasks to existing state officials, the legislatures themselves
sometimes exercised supervisory powers over insurance compa-
mes.8 Before that, the process of incorporation by special charter,
without more, gave the state some power over the insurance busi-
ness. One can summarize the development of insurance regula-
tion in the United States by saying that from an early date there
were occasional regulatory efforts by the legislatures; that in the
1820's regulatory powers began to be concentrated in the hands
of an existing state official, acting ex officio; that in the 1850's and
1860's many states concentrated insurance regulatory powers in
the hands of a special board or an individual designated primarily
to control insurance; and that ever since the creation of such an in-
surance department or agency, insurance supervision has been
rather steadily extended and systematized.9
In Europe there was a similar development. From very early
days there were scattered regulatory efforts. In the late fourteenth
century and in the fifteenth century, statutes regulating insurance
were enacted in Genoa, Florence, and Barcelona. 0 In the six-
teenth century there were occasional efforts at control in Eng-
land.1 For the most part, however, European insurance came
into the modem era an enterprise free from close regulation. Sys-
tematic control came even later to Europe than to the United
States.
It is no more possible to provide a precise date for the begin-
ning of systematic insurance regulation in Europe than it is in
America. In Germany, for example, there was already some sub-
stantial insurance supervision in the nineteenth century in such
important states as Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, and Wiirttem-
berg.' The location of that supervision at the individual state
7. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, vol. 1, p. 714; Mass. Laws 1827 (Jan. sess.),
ch. 141.
8. See, e.g., Mass. Laws 1807, ch. 66, p. 13.
9. A brief but. useful account of the early history of American insur-
ance regulation may be found m PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 519-
37. A detailed summary of the development of the Wisconsin department
is provided m. KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 174-208.
10. Holdsworth, The Early History of the Contract of Insurance, 17
CoLuM. L. Rlv. 85, 93-96 (1917).
11. Id. at-98.
12. The summary of German development is based largely on Biichner,
Die Entwicklung der deutschen Gesetzgebung fiber die Verstcherungsauf-
stcht bis zum Bundesgesetz yom 31. Juli 1951, in 1 FuFNFzIo JAnHRE MA-
TERIELLE VERSICHERr NoSAUFSICHT 1, 7-15 (ed. Rohrbeck, Berlin 1952).
By "substantial" I mean something akin to the German expression "ma-
1961]
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level, coupled with the lack of an effective expert agency, made
such regulation inadequate. As early as the 1860's there were
some demands in Germany for federal regulation of insurance,
and the foundation for legislation was laid in the constitutions of
186713 and 1871,'" which gave the requisite power to the Bund
(or Reich) Until the turn of the century, development toward a
federal regulatory agency was gradual and difficult, but inexor-
able. Finally, in 1901 a statute established a regime of systematic
and thoroughgoing control over private insurance, with some
supervisory powers remaining in the agencies of the individual
states, but with most powers going to a federal agency, the Kaiser-
liches Aufsichtsamt ffir Prtvatversicherung.5 From that time to
the present, except during the collapse at the end of World War
II, German regulation of insurance has been continuous and ef-
fective. 16
National regulation came earlier in Austria, where a statutory
order in 1880 provided for regulation of insurance companies.
Switzerland had comprehensive regulation from 1885.18 Sweden
established a regulatory agency in 1903, though for decades there
had already been lesser efforts to control insurance companies."
tenelle Staatsaufsicht," used by the Germans to describe their own sys-
tem and ours, in contrast to the English system, which they call a "Pub-
lizitatssystem." Id. at 5: Boss, SYSTEME DER STAATSAUFSICHT UEBER VER-
SICHERUNGSUNTERNEHMUNGEN 31 (Berlin 1955)
13. Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes vom 26. Juli 1867, Art. 4,
Ziff. 1, in [1867] Bundesgesetzblatt 1, 3 "Der Beaufsichtigung Seitens des
Bundes und der Gesetzgebung desselben unterliegen die nachstehenden
Angelegenheiten:(1) die Bestimmungen iiber den Gewerbebetrieb, einschliesslich des
Versicherungswesens "
14. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 16. April 1871, Art. 4, Ziff.
1, in [1871] Reichsgesetzblatt 64, 65. The 1871 terms are the same as
those of 1867, set out in note 13 supra.
15. Gesetz fiber die privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen vom 12.
Mai 1901, in [1901] Reichsgesetzblatt 139 (Ger.)
16. For the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the German regula-
tory agency (the Bundesaujsichtsamt fir das Versicherungs- und Bauspar-
wesen), a three-volume collection of essays was published, dealing with the
processes of insurance regulation in Germany. Collectively these essays pro-
vide some of the most perceptive analysis available in any language on
insurance regulation. See FUENFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGS-
AUFSICHT (ed. Rohrbeck, 3 vol. Berlin 1952-1955)
17 Verordnung der Ministerien des Innern, der Justiz, des Handels und
der Finanzen vom 18. August 1880, in [1880] Reichsgesetzblatt 398 (Aus-
tria); followed by Verordnung der Ministerien des Innern, der Justiz, des
Handels und der Finanzen vom 5. M~irz 1896, in [1896] Reichsgesetzblatt
63 (Austria)
18. Bundesgesetz, vom 25. Juni 1885, betreffend Beaufsichtigung von
Privatunternehmungen im Gebiete des Versicherungswesen, in 8 Amtliche
Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen der schweizerischen Eid-
genossensehaft 1874-1886, at p. 171 (Bern 1887)
19. FOERSAEKRINGSINSPEKTIONEN, ENSKILT FOERSAEKRINGSVAESEN
INSURANCE REGULATION
Everywhere the development was much as m the United States,
with unsystematic experiments during the nineteenth century, and
at the turn of the century or in the early decades of the twentieth
century a movement toward thoroughgoing and comprehensive
supervision of the industry."0 In the case of the federal states, the
movement was also one toward federal rather than state control
of insurance activity.2
Despite its comparative youth m most countries, insurance reg-
ulation has almost everywhere attained substantial dimensions and
complexity, and the trend toward strengthening it seems to be con-
tinuing.22 Among the older and larger supervisory agencies, both
in Europe and in- the United States, are some with well-established
traditions and considerable expertise.
Notwithstanding the firm establishment of insurance regulation
in the twentieth century, it has grown with little clear sense of
purpose. At least in the United States, and probably in most coun-
tries, its detailed patterns have come mainly as specific responses
to particular felt needs of the moment. Sometimes these needs
were felt as the result of dramatic revelations of scandal. For ex-
ample, the public disclosure of unsavory life insurance company
practices that resulted from New York's Armstrong Committee
hearings in 190523 led quickly to sweeping changes in the regula-
11-12 (Stockholm 1954). This booklet (pp. 9-20 of which provide a sum-
mary of its contents in English) was published by the Swedish regulatory
agency on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. For the 1903 Swedish
statute, see [1903] Svensk Fbrfattmngssamling Nr. 94.
20. For a study of European regulation as it stood in the 1950's see
Boss, op. cit. supra note 12. My illustrations will be drawn almost exclusive-
ly from American, Swedish, and German materials.
21. American state regulation is often contrasted with German regula-
tion, which is largely at the federal level. The companson is only partly
apt, for the United States is a continent. For further discussion of the fed-
eral problem, see text accompanying notes 136-43 infra.
22. Sweden in 1960 was considering a government committee's recom-
mendations for stricter regulation of private insurance. STATENS OFFNT-
LIGA UTREDNINGAR 1960: 11, OEVERSyN AV LAGEN om FOERSAEKRINGS-
RORELSE (Stockholm 1960). In 1954 the Netherlands began to regulate in-
surance marketing. Schreiber, Die nzederliindische Verstcherungswirtschaft,
[1959] VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFTLICHEs ARcHiv 51, 55. In the Unit-
ed States, one recent innovation of importance is the regulation of credit
life insurance, which began with Wis. Laws 1957, ch. 321. Other Amen-
can moves toward strengthening insurance regulation are at once apparent
to the most casual reader of the trade press.
23. See STATE OF NEW YORK, TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE [AND RE-
PORT OF] THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY AP-
POINTED TO INVESTIGATE AND EXAMINE INTO THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANIES (10 vols. 1905). For a good summary of this inves-
tigation, see 1 PusEY, CHARLES EvANs HUGHES 140-68 (1951). See also
JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE 139-65 (1947); CLOUGH, A CENrTUY
OF AMmucAN LIFE INSURANCE 215-32 (1946). A muckraking account is
given in HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1907), first publish-
ed in 27 MCCLURE'S MAGAZINE 36, 157, 237, 401, 539, 659 (1906).
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tion of insurance.24 It also led to important alterations in the
structure of the industry, such as the mutualization of many large
companies,25 the formation of many new companies in the West
and South," and the formation of the American Life Conven-
tion. -7 There were other kinds of pressure, too. For example,
when the United States Supreme Court decided that insurance
was commerce subject to the federal anti-trust laws,2" Congress
acted quickly to permit continued state regulation and taxation
of insurance.29 This was followed by the vitalization and exten-
sion of rate regulation at the state level, in order to preclude fur-
ther federal intervention.3°
As with legal growth generally, the development of American
insurance law has been much influenced by the factors of inertia
and drift.31 It has moved forward only under considerable pres-
sure, and then with little conscious planning-and certainly with-
out the articulation of an integrated theory It may be that such a
theory is impossible in a pluralistic society with widely dispersed
decision-making powers. However, only if the objectives of regula-
tion can be systematically stated and the conflicts among them
understood can insurance regulation be made fully to serve the
public interest.
American writing on insurance regulation is largely concerned
with purely practical problems, and little of it has value for our
present purpose. The one significant American study of insur-
ance regulation-Patterson's book3" of thirty years ago-makes
little effort to deal systematically with the substance of regulation,
seeking only incidentally to isolate purposes or objectives.33 The
24. For a summary of legislation in New York resulting from the Arm-
strong investigation, see STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE: ITS His-
TORY IN AMERICA 551-52 (1942) Investigations in other states also pro-
duced significant changes. Ibid. The developments in Wisconsin are explor-
ed in KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 110, 155, 163-71, 173 (1960)
25. MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 86-88 (1939), Dawson, MUTUALIZATION
OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, 70 Annals 62 (1917)
26. 1 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 1906-1952: A STUDY
IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE 247 (1953)
27 Id. at 248, 264-65 passim.
28. United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944)
29. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958)
30. See generally Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State insurancd
Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56
MICH. L. REV 545 (1958), and materials cited therein.
31. See generally HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY (1960)
32. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 6.
33. I have attempted to relate the law to underlying public policy in
the historical development of a single state, Wisconsin, in KIMBALL, op.
cit. supra note 1.
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Germans and the Swedes have gone further than we have in mak-
ing a useful explanation of the reasons for regulatory activity,"4
but even they do not have any fully satisfactory statements. Nor
would German or Swedish theories be altogether suitable for trans-
plantation to American soil, where we have complicating factors
of our own. Moreover, German writers fend to seek so assiduously
for a single abstract principle that will comprehend a highly com-
plex set of activities' that they lose contact with the diversity
and raggedness that are the hallmarks of reality. Nevertheless, I
shall draw on European materials, especially Swedish and Ger-
man, to illustrate some of the ideas contained here. But I do not
intend to make an ekhaustive comparison of the systems in
this essay.
In this Article my purpose is not to offer a general theory of in-
surance regulation; but to suggest in a preliminary way-hope-
fully for further discussion-some public policy objectives in the
field of insurance regulation, together with some conflicts among
them. A mature synthesis would require more extensive consider-
ation than is fruitful until many people have discussed the subject
from varying points of view. At this point in time, I can do no
more'than attempt to provide a reasonably clear articulation of the
basic purposes of regulation, and of their relationships, in the
hope that this will serve as a useful guide to legislative action and
regulatory activity.
By regulation, in the present context, I mean all kinds of legal
control over insurance, whether by judicial decision, by self-exe-
cuting legislation, or by administrative activity of the insurance
commissioner.
The major objective of insurance regulation is to facilitate the
successful operation of the insurance enterprise itself. But other
public policies reflecting pervasive attitudes in society influence
the insurance- regulatory pattern. They may channel or restrict
the insurance enterprise, or merely change in a variety of ways
the internal operation of the business.
The principal division of the subject, then, is between those ob-
jectives that relate to the internal working of the insurance busi-
34. See Starke, Die Entwicklungslinen der nzatertellen Staatsausficht in
der ersten Hilfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in 3 FUENFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE
VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT 11, 57-74 (ed. Rohrbeck, Berlin (1955)). And
see the elaborate Swedish studies in preparation for legislation, of which
the report cited in note 22 i§ a good example; it contained over 500 pagcs
of text.
35. E.g., Starke, supra note 34. Consider also the use of the almost
mystical notion of the Gefahrengemeinschaft, or insured community, as a
basic idea m insurance law. See, e.g., BRUCK-MOELLER, KomMENTAR ZUM
VERSICHERUTNGSVERTRAGSGESETZ UND ZU DEN ALLOEMEINEN VERSICHEa-
UNGSBEDINGUNGEN 96-97 (8. Auflage 1953).
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ness, and those that derive primarily from its relationships to the
world outside. Within the first class, one aim has overwhelming
importance: the solidity or solvency of insurance companies. Sup-
plementing and sometimes conflicting with that objective is an
amorphous congeries of policy goals which, for want of a better
term, we may call the objective of aequum et bonum. In a sense,
solidity and aequum et bonum could be combined in a single
aim, the protection of the policyholder. But it seems more fruitful
to divide the all-encompassing purpose, by asking "protection
for what"'9
I. INTERNAL WORKING OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDITY
Insurance performs important functions in social life, with both
objective and subjective aspects. Objectively it provides a mechan-
ism for solving many of the problems inherent in the unpredict-
able character of human life. It ensures that if a home bums an-
other will take its place, that if a breadwinner dies prematurely
his children will not starve or go without an education, that if a
ship sinks its owner and the owners of its cargo may continue in
business without the traumatic experience of bankruptcy In short,
it provides a degree of objective certainty in an uncertain world,
it converts unpredictable risk to predictable cost, it smooths the
path of economic activity Subjectively insurance gives the buyer
confidence that if his home burns he can build another, that if
he dies prematurely his children can go to college, or that if his
ship sinks he will not need to go through bankruptcy proceedings.
In short, insurance also provides the policyholder with a sense of
security, a feeling of confidence about the future, a freedom from
anxiety about parts of the unknown. The more perceptive spokes-
men for the industry recognize this dual role of insurance. One
recently said.
My purpose tonight is to suggest the egregious error of assuming that
our business rests upon a statistical foundation. It does not. It rests
upon an emotional foundation. I cannot think of insurance
as simply an arm's length business transaction. The public expects more
of us than that. It expects security and peace of mind. 36
The subjective and objective aspects of the needs met by in-
surance are closely related, but they are distinct. There seems no
reason to doubt the legitimacy of either. One should not lose sight
36. Morrill, "The Common Denominator", Address before the Casualty
Actuarial Society, Nov 17, 1960, pp. 1, 3 of mimeographed text (also
reported in National Underwriter, Fire and Casualty Edition, Dec. 16,
1960, p. 8)
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of the sense of security given by the insurance institution, for
supervision of insurance with a view only to enabling it to provide
objective economic security may preclude its use to provide a sense
of security. One might, for example, prohibit forms of insurance
activity involving only very small claims that almost everyone
can afford to bear, on the ground that the expense of handling
such claims makes the insurance quite uneconomic in relation to
the service rendered. Yet it is possible that attention to the sub-
jective or psychic contribution of insurance would tip the scale in
favor of permitting or even encouraging such insurance.
The needs for security and for a feeling of security seem uni-
versal, but the particular forms they take and the institutions that
satisfy them are extremely varied and are culturally determined.
In pre-capitalist forms of social organization, man achieved se-
curity, both economic and psychic, through a variety of inter-
personal relationships which were central to the society and were
highly institutionalized and often very complex. Thus in many
primitive societies kinship was the basis of social organization, and
one of the chief purposes of the network of rights and duties
making up the kinship pattern was the provision of mutual aid
to distressed individuals.3" Mutual aid is a central aspect of cul-
ture-Leslie White even speculates that the universal incest taboo
was a product of the need to provide a broader base for the mu-
tual aid structure of kinship-organized primitive society.'
In more advanced cultures, functionally similar phenomena ex-
ist. Thus, in medieval society the reciprocal rights and duties
which made up the feudal relationship provided both a feeling of
security and a reasonable measure of actual security against
many of the more pressing vicissitudes of life, for lord and man
alike. And when the lord-vassal relationship did not provide the
security, the Church or specially developed institutions like the
medieval guild did.
The presence everywhere in pre-capitalist societies of insurance-
like institutions led William Graham Sumner to the provocative
suggestion that the insurance concept was a fundamental one
which could be used with profit to explain much of social organi-
zation in all times and places. He even went so far as to describe
religion as a species of the genus "insurance" which was, he
thought-
a generic conception covering the methods of attaining security, of
which the modem devices are but specific, highly elaborated, and
scientifically tested examples ...
37. HOEBEL, MAN IN THE PRnmTivE WoRLD 347, 355 (2d ed. 1958).
38. WArr, THE ScmNcE OF Cuz.Lr uE 158-59, 313-27 (1949).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 471
Insurance is a grand device and is now a highly technical process;
but its roots go farther back than one would think, offhand. Man on
earth, having always had an eye to the avoidance of ill luck, has tried
in all ages somehow to insure himself-to take out a "policy" of some
sort on which he has paid regular premiums in some form of self-
denial or sacrifice. 39
When the capitalist revolution swept away feudal society in
Western Europe, it destroyed the structure that provided security
through complex interpersonal relationships, and replaced it by
the "cash nexus." Men no longer had personal relationships com-
prehensive enough, or dependable enough, to provide the security
and the feeling of security that are the final goals of much of the
human struggle. Those goals had to be sought through new insti-
tutions. One ultimate consequence of the transition from feudal-
ism to the market-oriented contemporary society-a consequence
which is only now beginning to come into clear focus-was the
development of a ubiquitous system of insurance, in the modern
sense of a scientifically organized technique for the distribution of
risks through an institution that has no other purpose. This insti-
tution provides security and the sense of security partly through
commercial companies operating in the market and partly through
governmental organizations ol'erating in an analogous manner
In these ways modern man secures for himself all of the tangible
security and a large part of the feeling of security that were lost
when the old order was swept away
This much has been said to emphasize the centrality of the
"insurance" institution in both primitive and advanced societies.
Insurance is one important modern way that man seeks security
in a world in which it does not exist naturally It is thus not
surprising that all systems of insurance regulation regard the fi-
nancial solvency of the insurance enterprise as the central aim, for
if nothing else, insurance must insure. Some systems of regulation,
notably that of Great Britain, seem to proceed little beyond that
point. Other systems recognize additional goals, often only partly
articulated.
The principle of solidity4" is pervasive; it inheres in almost
every corner of the regulator's field of activity Elsewhere I have
dealt with the law governing the internal operation of the insur-
ance business under three major headings: the creation of an
adequate insurance fund, the preservation of the integrity of the
insurance fund, and the distribution of the fund in order to satis-
39 2 SUMNER & KELLER, THE SCIENCE OF SociETY 749, passim, (as
indicated by index heading "Insurance") (1927)
40. The Swedes speak of soliditet, the Germans of Letstungsilihigkelt,
and the French of solvabiliti. We speak more often of solvency, but solid-
ity has the advantage that it does not now have a technical meaning.
480
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fy the security needs for which it was collected. 1 In the first two
headings the objective of solidity is central; all other objectives are
no more than qualifications or limitations of it. But m the distribu-
tion of the fund, the principle of solidity is merely one of a pair
of goals which contend with each other in precarious balance. In
distributing the fund, a task supervised by the courts, the need to
preserve the fund against unreasonable claims which threaten its
existence must continually be weighed against the aim of ensuring
that policyholders' reasonable expectations are fulfilled. In per-
forming their task, courts have not always perceived the former.
The goal of solidity is sought in ways that are legion. The fol-
lowing description is not intended as a catalogue, but as an illus-
tration of some of the principal controls reflecting this purpose.
At the very threshold of insurance activity, statutes exhibit the
state's interest in solidity by control of the form of organization
through which insurance is carried on. Though the law generally
permits operation in a wide variety of forms-including mutual
and stock corporations, mterinsurance exchanges, and syndicates-
there are often restrictions which make it impracticable for an
individual entrepreneur or partnership to enter the business as an
insurer, and which discourage the use of the Lloyds group. Once
the form of organization is chosen, the concern of the law to im-
plement the solidity principle becomes more profound, and sig-
nificant demands are made to ensure adequate capitalization of
the new enterprise. Not enough thought about the role of capital
in insurance lies behind the statutes, but the conceptual inade-
quacies do not alter the state's great interest in the question. In a
going insurance business, capital plays a relatively subordinate
role; the business operates on what is an essentially mutual basis,
distributing risk among all participants, with capital serving merely
as an added buffer against unpredictably high losses. But in the
early days of any insurance company, capital plays a crucial role,
until "the law of large numbers" enables the company to operate
with assurance as merely a risk distributor. It is not surprising,
therefore, that fairly substantial sums of paid-in capital are requi-
41. See KMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. 1.
42. E.g., N. Y. INs. LAw § 43 requires that an insurer be either an in-
dividual or a corporation; it also requires an individual insurer to be a
New'York resident, to comply with the statutory requirements for capital,
surplus, reserves, liabilities, investments, and deposits, to engage in no oth-
er business, and in general to conform to all corporate requirements ex-
cept corporate existence. N. Y. INs. LAv § 425(4) prohibits subsequent
organization in the state of Lloyds underwriters, and prohibits licensing
of foreign or alien Lloyds underwriters. [The prohibition applies both to
Lloyds of London and to American Lloyds groups.] The history of Wis-
consin law concerning the form of private insurers is described in KMBALL,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-52.
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site to the formation of a capital stock insurer.43 Functionally
similar requirements apply to the formation of mutual or recipro-
cal insurers, the statutes usually requiring that policyholders be
assessable until designated surpluses have been accumulated, and
forbidding any operation at all unless a prescribed number of par-
ticipants have agreed to purchase the insurance.44
Concern for solidity has led American states to exercise control
over the adequacy of premium rates in non-life insurance. The
All-Industry laws, passed by the states to provide premium rate
regulation sufficient to exclude federal power under the terms of
the McCarran Act,4" require that rates shall not be "excessive,
inadequate, [or] unfairly discriminatory "46 Though some state
insurance departments have a tendency to focus too much on the
requirement that rates not be excessive, losing sight of the greater
need that they be adequate, that emphasis may be based upon an
assumption that the insurance companies are capable of taking
care of themselves. Up to a point the assumption is justified; the
self-interest of the insurer is a powerful aid to the public imple-
43. E.g., N. Y INS. LAW § 191 requires paid-in capital of at least $300,-
000 and paid-in surplus at least equal to half its capital, for a stock life
insurance company Section 311 provides for various capital requirements
varying from $100,000 to $500,000, with an additional surplus requirement
of fifty per cent of capital, to write various forms of casualty insurance,
with larger amounts required for combinations of lines; it also requires
that the company maintain a surplus of $1,500,000 if reinsurance is in-
cluded. Section 341 provides similar requirements for fire and marine in-
surance. The Wisconsin history of capital requirements is treated in KIM-
BALL, up. cit. supra note 1, at 75-79
44. E.g., N. Y INS. LAW § 196 provides for formation of a mutual
life insurance company, requiring prior to incorporation 1,000 bona fide
applications for life insurance in an amount not less than $1,000 each, and
payment from each such applicant of a full annual premium, in an ag-
gregate of at least $25,000. The company must have an initial surplus
of $150,000, as well. Section 197 forbids the issuance of assessable policies
by mutual life insurance companies. But cf. § 58, which provides for the
issuance of nonassessable policies by mutual companies, in most lines of
insurance, only after those companies have made certain accumulations
specified in the section. For the Wisconsin historical development, see KIM-
BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 79-82. It should be noted that these re-
quirements make it difficult, if not impossible, to organize a new company
as a mutual. HUEBNER & BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 454 (5th ed. 1958)
45. Section 2(b) of the McCarran Act precludes application of federal
statutes to insurance, unless the statutes specifically relate thereto, "Pro-
vided, That after June 30, 1948 the Sherman Act the Clay-
ton Act [and] the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State law." 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 61 Stat.
448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1958) This proviso has put heavy pres-
sure on the states to develop adequate rate regulatory machinery.
46. E.g., N. Y INS. LAW § 180 proposes regulation so that rates "shall
not be excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise unreason-
able " A brief summary of the development of the model acts may
be found m 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE 216 (5th ed. 1952)
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mentation of the goal of solidity. But self-interest is not always
enough, as a melancholy procession of insurance insolvencies at-
tests.47
The long-term character of the life insurance contract makes
adequacy of premium rates even more important there than in
the fire and casualty business, but in the United States there has
been no direct regulation of life insurance rates. Instead, rates are
governed indirectly by reserve requirements. The "legal reserve"
is an amount that, together with future premiums, all accumulated
at an assumed rate of interest, will suffice to satisfy the company's
future obligations as predicted by specified mortality tables. So
long as the company has assets to match this reserve liability, it
is deemed solvent. Generally, rather conservative tables are used
for reserve computation, and not infrequently a company can af-
ford to (and does) collect from the insured gross premiums
which are lower than the net premiums (i.e., without expense
loading) computed from the valuation tables used for reserves.
When the gross premiums are that low, the legislatures have re-
quired the company to fund the difference between the company's
actual gross premiums and the net premiums computed from the
valuation tables, in a so-called "deficiency reserve." The company
may continue to charge any premium rate it wishes, however; even
here there is no direct regulation of the minimum level of life in-
surance premium rates. 8
In Germany the situation is otherwise. In life insurance, in other
personal insurance, and in automobile insurance there is direct
regulation of premium rates; in other lines there is only indirect
and casual control. Life insurance rate regulation is authorized
by statute; the power comes from the requirement that an appli-
cant for a license as an insurer must submit for administrative ap-
proval a Geschdltsplan, or plan for doing business, which must
make clear how the future obligations of the company can be met
on a continuing basis.49 It must contain the company's schedule
47. The harmful consequences of insolvencies would be greater were it
not for the willingness of responsible companies, in the interest of the pub-
lie image of the whole industry, to engage in rescue operations. For some
cases where the self-interest of insurers was not enough to ensure an ade-quate rate structure, see KIMBALL & CONKLIN, T MONTANA INSUR-
ANCE COMMISSiONER: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIvE REGULATION IN
AcTION 30-33 (1960). It should be noted that regulation of rates reflects
several different public policies. It will be discussed again in other connec-
tions.
48. For the actuarial theory of the deficiency reserve, see Actuarial So-
ciety of America, Informal Discussion on a New Mortality Table, [1957]
TRANSACTIONS 212. Life insurance rate making and the deficiency reserve
law are discussed briefly in KMBALL, op. cit, supra note 1, at 110-12.
49. Gesetz Uiber die Beaufsichtigung der privaten Versicherungsunter-
nehmungen und Bausparkassen [hereafter abbreviated VAG] §§ 5 & 11,
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of rates and its principles for computation of premium and re-
serve. For the most part informally, but sometimes quite formally,
the German regulatory agency"° uses its power to approve or
disapprove the Geschdftsplan in order to exercise control over
minimum rate levels in life insurance. For example, one nonpar-
ticipating life insurer proposed in its Geschiijtsplan a gross premi-
um loaded very slightly for expense, the company relying instead
on mortality savings and excess interest earnings to take care of
the company's expenses. The government agency declined to ap-
prove the premium calculations, insisting that the gross premium
must contain a fair charge for expenses, in addition to the net
premium, and that the company must not speculate on its future
profits in this way "
The statutory sections specifying the contents of the Geschiilts-
plan do not require insurers in lines other than life and other
personal insurance to submit rate schedules for approval. There
are broadly phrased general powers enabling the regulatory agency
to take action to alter the Geschdftsplan, even with effect upon ex-
isting contracts, where necessary for the protection of the policy-
holder's interests, but even this probably provides no control over
minimum levels of premium rates in the non-personal lines of in-
surance. 2 Automobile insurance is a special case. Under powers
that date from 1938,11 the German Economics Minister (and not
the regulatory agency), is empowered to set the premiums to be
charged in automobile insurance. However, the continuing post-
war German tendency to eliminate controls over business enter-
prise is illustrated by a 1959 statutory order relinquishing the
power to set premiums. From the end of 1961, all automobile
premiums will be made by the companies themselves-subject,
however, to a continuing requirement of approval by the Eco-
vom 6. Juni 1931, in [1931] Reichsgesetzblatt 1.315 (Ger.) The Gesetz
may be most conveniently studied, as subsequently modified, in PROELSS,
VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSGESETZ (Mifinchen und Berlin, 2 ed. 1957)
50. I.e., The Bundesaustichtsarnt fiir das Versicherungs- und Bauspar-
wesen.
51. Veriffentlichungen des Kaiserlichen Aufsichtsamtes fUr die Pnvat-
versicherung, 1908 at p. 114 (Geschliftsbericht 1907) The statutory sections
that specify the contents of the Geschiijtsplan are VAG §§ 11 & 12.
52. VAG § 81a. See also VAG §§ 81 & 89 And see Finke & Pfeif-
fer, Markt-, Preis- und Wettbewerbsordnung im Aufsichtsrecht und in der
Aufstchtspraxis, in 1 FUENFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUF-
SICHT, op. cit. supra note 16, at 104, 123. For effects on premium regu-
lation, see Fritz, Beitragsgerechtigkeit in der Privatversicherung voin
Standpunkt der Aufsichtsfahrung, in [1958] VERSICHERUNOSWISSENSCHAPT-
LICHES ARCHIV 269
53. In 1938 the power was in a special officer, the Retchskommissar ffir
die Pretsbildung. Verordnung iiber die Versicherung von Kraftfahrzeugen
vom 14. Februar 1938, in [1938] Reichsgesetzblatt 1.200 (Ger.)
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nomics Minister. After 1965, automobile insurance premiums will
be as free from control as other non-life premiums."
In all fields of insurance, the law expresses concern about the
way in which the company's accounts are kept, compelling an ac-
curate expression of the company's liabilities, actual and potential,
so that the degree of its solvency or solidity is always clear. The
need for this kind of control over reserves in a business in which
income long precedes outgo is obvious. Even in a field where poli-
cies are sold for fairly short terms, such as fire or casualty, with-
out proper accounting a company with an expanding volume of
business could conceal indefinitely a condition of potential in-
solvency which would become at once apparent and threatening
if the volume of business were stable. Only a realistic appraisal of
assets and liabilities exhibits the true condition of the business, in
the face of fluctuating volume. Thus the reserve laws go to the
very heart of insurance regulation, providing reliable information
for the protection of solvency. 5 The control is implemented by
an elaborate program of examinations of the books of the com-
panies.5 6
Another way in which the principle of solidity is implemented
is by public control over investments. In the United States, this
kind of control has been very strict for a long time, especially in
life insurance. The life insurance company, whose liabilities are
expressed in terms of a fixed number of dollars, has been com-
pelled by law to invest very largely in fixed-dollar assets.17 Invest-
ment in equities has traditionally been thought too risky in view
54. Verordnung PR Nr. 15/59 zur Auflockerung der Preisbmdung in
der Kraftfahrversicherung vom 19. Dezember 1959, Bundesanzeiger Nr.
249 vom 30. Dezember 1959; Veri~ffentlichungen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes
fir das Versicherungs- und Bausparwesen, [1959/60] Geschiftsbencht 45.
55. E.g., N. Y. INs. LAw § 73 provides for valuation reserves for life
insurance policies; section 74 provides for unearned premium reserves in
other lines; section 72 provides for loss or claim reserves. See also section
352 for loss reserves of fire and marine companies. These provisions do
not exhaust the field; they barely scratch the surface of this kind of
regulation. The German provisions are equally elaborate, with wide dis-
cretionary power to control forms given to the agency. See, e.g., VAG § 55.
56. N. Y. INs. LAW § 28 permits the superintendent to examine the af-
fairs of insurance companies as often as he deems it expedient, and re-
quires him to do so triennially for some domestic companies and every
five years for others. And see generally N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 26-32. The
German system, while quite different in detail, provides the same kind of
thorough control. See VAG §§ 56-65.
57. E.g., N. Y. INs. LAw §§ 79-81. The history of investment regula-
tion is illuminating. A quick impression for New York can be gained by
tracing § 81 backward through its annotation in McKinney's Consolidated
Laws. An exhaustive study of the history of Wisconsin's investment lawvs is
provided in K.BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 129-40. For the equally
strict German rules, see VAG § § 66-69.
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of the long-term and inflexible nature of insurance obligations.
Thus, over the past century life insurance company investments
have been heavily concentrated in bonds, both government and
private, and in mortgages.58 With the increasing amount of money
available for investment by insurance companies and by other in-
stitutions that are subject to similar restrictions, the implementation
of the aim of solidity has come increasingly into conflict with oth-
er values or purposes, and the restrictions on investments have
recently been modified in various ways. This conflict we shall ex-
plore further.59
Though these are the principal ways in which the goal of solid-
ity is sought, they are by no means the only ways. The aim is ubiq-
uitous and insistent, and may be seen throughout the field of in-
surance law It would be unfortunate for the rational develop-
ment of insurance law if any specific question were answered with-
out explicit attention to its implications for the solidity of the enter-
prise. That is not to say that solidity is the only goal to be sought
nor that it should always and everywhere prevail, but it is too
important ever to ignore-though occasionally it seems to be ig-
nored by judges or legislators, or even by insurance commissioners.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF AEQUUM ET BONUM
Although it is hard to deny the propriety of utilizing legal con-
trols to ensure the solidity of insurance companies, there is more
disposition to question interference by the law on behalf of a
congeries of objectives perhaps best expressed by the term
aequum et bonum. This term is chosen precisely because it lacks
precision, thereby reflecting the vague character of the objectives
and at the same time adequately expressing their general thrust.
The objective of aequum et bonum is present in some degree in
most systems of insurance law and regulation. It has many facets:
It is equity It is morality It is fairness, equality, reasonableness.
It may even be efficiency, economy, parsimony I shall seek to
isolate and explore three principal components of this complex
objective, after first illustrating its complexity and flexibility by
looking at the history of the principle in Swedish law
The most interesting development in Swedish insurance law
since World War II has been the explicit recogmtion of a second
objective of insurance regulation. The Swedes have long regarded
58. Statistics on the distribution of life insurance assets for the last 40
years are given in INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
64-65. Detailed information about investment policy of a single, but very
important, company is provided in WILLIAMSON & SMALLEY, NORTHWEST-
ERN MUTUAL LIFE: A CENTURY OF TRUSTEESHIP (1957)
59. See text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
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soliditet as the major purpose of supervision. About the end of
the war, the term skdlighet (which the Swedes themselves translate
as "equity") came into common use to describe a second objec-
tive.6" The content of skdlighet is uticertam, flexible, and grow-
mg.
The term seems first to have entered technical insurance law in
1948, as a legal standard applied to life insurance."' It received
application to other insurance in 1950,62 and the extension of its
meaning to include new ideas was bruited about in 1960.63 Long
before its adoption in 1948, the principle was felt as a moral ob-
ligation of insurers, in some contexts, and was often a factor in
the informal negotiations between the regulatory agency and the
companies. Some explicit demand for skdlighet as a legal standard
seems to have existed as early as 1914, but it did not then find
expression in the law. Some of the idea of skdlighet, though not
the term, was incorporated in the Motor Third Party Insurance
Law of 1929.64 Formal acceptance of the term in 1948 resulted
from the deliberations of a series of government committees in-
vestigating the insurance business, beginning as early as 1937.1
The 1937 committee suspended its work at the outbreak of war,
but another committee, consisting of the chief of the regulatory
agency, a professor of actuarial science, a member of the Riksdag
(Parliament), and three insurance company directors, was ap-
pointed in 1942 by the Swedish Minister of Commerce. 6 The
committee studied exhaustively the problems of the adjustment of
insurance to the changing economic conditions. The committee's
60. STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR 1946:34, FOERSAEKRINGSUTRED-
NINGEN: FORSLAG TILL LAG OM FOERSAEKRINGSROERELSE M.M., I. MOTIV
33 (Stockholm 1946). A part of the lengthy report is translated into English
under the title, ADJUSTMENT OF SWEDISH LIFE INSURANCE TO CHANGES
IN THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, EXTRACT from an OFFICIAL REPORT
(Stockholm 1946). See page 16 of translated extract. The French speak of
la moraliti de 'assurance. FOURASTIE, LE CONTROLE DE L'ETAT SUR LES
SoCiETES D' ASSURANCES 259 (3 ed. Pans 1944).
61. [1948] Svensk F6rfattnngssamling Nr. 433, § 263. And see HELL-
NER, FOERSAEKEINGSRAETT 40-47 (1959).
62. [1950] Svensk Fdrfattningssamling Nr. 320, § 282, 2 mom.; Ar-
PELTOFFT, A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF TWO REPORTS RENDERED BY AN OF-
FICIAL SWEDISH COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 18, 22-25 (Stockholm 1949).
63. STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTRENDNINGAR 1960:11, OEVERSYN AV LAGEN
OM FOERSAEKRINGSROERELSE 182-279 (Stockholm 1960); STUDY OF INsUR-
ANCE SUPERVISION, SWEDEN 30 (1960), a mimeographed statement in Eng-
lish prepared by the Fiirs'dkrngs Inspektionen.
64. STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. cit. supra note
60, at 34 (translated extract at 16); [1929] Svensk F6rfattningssamling
Nr. 77, §§ 8 &9.
65. FOERSAEKRINGS INSPEKTIONEN, ENSKILT FOERSAEKRINGSVAESEN 14
(Stockholm 1954).
66. Ibid. See also STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. Cit.
supra note 60 (translated extract at 5).
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statement of the principles of regulation began with mention of
solidity as the basic value. It then continued.
In addition to the above-mentioned demand, there is also the rc-
quirement that life insurance business should be conducted on a basis
of equity or fairness towards the policy-holders. The demand for se-
curity renders it necessary to calculate the premiums to be paid by
policy-holders at a higher rate than is actually expected to be rcqui-
site, as a safeguard against adverse deviations from the estimated
proceeds of the business. Under normal conditions it may therefore
be expected that the business will result in a surplus. This surplus re-
verts to the insured in the form of a return of premiums, and the
real cost which the policy-holders incur for their insurances thus
corresponds to the premiums paid minus a share in the profit earn-
ed. In order that a financial business of this kind shall be regarded as
fair towards the policy-holders, it must therefore be demanded that
the actual cost in question may be considered to be a reasonable
price for the services rendered by the insurance company to the in-
dividual policy-holders.
67
In this initial development, skdlighet included only two notions-
that the price charged to policyholders should be reasonable, and
that the cost should be equitably distributed among the policy-
holders." These facets of the doctrine would naturally appear
first because of their monetary character. They would predictably
appear first in life insurance, where the long term of the contract
and the principle of solidity require conservative operation (i.e.,
that initial premiums be large enough to produce a surplus, often
a large one) Perhaps beginning in the thinking about mortality
savings, it early came to be generally accepted in Sweden not only
that premium charges as adjusted by dividend payments should
be reasonable, but that this end should be achieved by means of
limitations on the profits available for distribution to stockhold-
ers. 
69
This principle received surprisingly early acceptance in com-
pany circles, facilitated perhaps by the fact that entrepreneurial
motivation in life insurance in Sweden seems to have been con-
cerned less with direct profits than with control of accumulated
assets, and by a feeling that life insurance is less a part of the
business system than an institution of social welfare operating in
favor of the insured. Even before 1948, the important stock
67 STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946: 34, op. cit. supra note
60, at 33 (translated extract at 16) If competition is vigorous enough, such
surpluses may not develop, but one may then argue that the requirements
of solidity are not being met.
68. FOERSAEICRINGSINSPEKTIONEN, op. cit. Supra note 19, at 15.
69. STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. cit. supra note
60, at 64 (translated extract at 44-45) "To carry on insurance business
without the participation of the policy-holders in the surplus is incompati-
ble with the principle of equity See HELLNER, op, cit. supra
note 61, at 42 n.7 (1959)
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companies were quasi-mutualized, in the sense that they became
participating and they limited stockholders' profits to modest
amounts.70 Then the 1948 law enacted the principle of equity for
life insurance ind thus put strict legal limits on the permissible
profit of life insurance companies.71 Among the company people
I interviewed in Stockholm in the spring of 1960, I discovered
rather little feeling of injustice as a result of this limitation.
The. 1942 committee perceived another, much less important,
dimension to the principle of reasonableness in price, for in.sev-
eral passages the committee talked about the need for limiting ex-
penses:
It follows from the principle of equity that the company's costs must
hot be higher than corresponds to the services which the company
renders. ... [It seems reasonable to demand that the services ren-
dered by the company m connection with its insurance business should
be in good conformity with the real needs of its policy-holders,
and that the costs therefore should stand in fair proportion to the
value of those services.. .7
This notion of economy, or sparsamhet, was fairly limited in the
1942 report, but by 1960 there seemed to be a slight tendency to
give it a broader meaning. Thus, some people felt that compa-
rues-had an obligation to be economical, even parsimonious, with
respect to home office expenses, agency conferences, and ameni-
ties for employees and executives. But the companies have not
yet acquiesced in a broader interpretation, as they have long since
done with respect to the limitation of profits, and it is not yet clear
that the tendency is of any real consequence. 74
The widespread acceptance of skiilighet in insurance circles in
Sweden.:would be more surprising were it not for the immediate
post-war political developments. In 1945 Social Democrats and
Communists in the Riksdag made demands for an exhaustive in-
quiry ifito private insurance institutions.75 The Communists pro-
posed nationalization; the original post-war program of the Social
Democrats also urged nationalization, though the specific Social
70: The two preceding sentences are based on interviews in Stockholm
in 1960 with various responsible and knowledgeable people connected with
Swedish insurance. I -do not read Swedish and have access to the Swedish
insurance literature only' when it is written in English or is translated for
me.
71. See statute cited in note 61 supra; APPELToFFT, op. cit. supra
note.62, at 18.
72. I asked this specific question of a number of people.
73. STATENS- OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. cit. supra note
60, at 39 (translated extract, at 21) See also id. at 65 (translated extract
at 45).
74. These observations stem from interviews conducted by the author
in Stockholm in 1960. See note 70 supra.
75. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 5.
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Democratic demands extended only to far-reaching control over
most aspects of the private insurance business, not merely to en-
sure safe and fair operation of the business but also to effectuate
other social policies. The special commission appointed for the
investigation consisted of three representatives of the Social Demo-
cratic party and one each from the other four parties in the Riks-
dag, including the Communist party The majority of the commis-
sion thus represented the two parties that had been highly critical
of private insurance in Sweden. Unlike the 1942 committee, the
1945 investigating commission consisted largely of politicians, not
of insurance experts. Its 1949 report resulted in the extension of
the principle of skdlighet to nearly all branches of insurance other
than life insurance, so that reasonableness in premiums became
an almost universal legal standard."6 Indirectly, the very existence
of the commission was important in inducing acceptance of the
reforms of the 1942 committee, which were being discussed while
the 1945 commission was sitting. The principle of skdlighet is
therefore regarded by many in Sweden as a political compromise
between the advocacy of nationalization or far-reaching govern-
ment intervention in the insurance business on the one extreme,
and the advocacy of a laissez-faire policy on the other.7"
Despite the lack of precision in the Swedish formulation of the
notion of skiilighet, and the lack of any explicit formulation of a
similar principle in most other systems, it seems clear that the
notion is in fact implemented in much of the law of insurance in
all countries. In Germany, for example, one widely suggested, all-
encompassing purpose of insurance regulation is the protection of
the policyholder (Schutztheorie), which includes both the solidity
principle and a complex principle of "equity ,78 In France a prin-
ciple of la moralite de l'assurance is recognized.79
Let us attempt to isolate and describe the principal components
of the principle we have designated aequum et bonum. The in-
itial thrust of skiilighet was reasonableness of the price paid for
insurance. This objective is very widely espoused. Let us designate
it the objective of reasonableness. It asserts that the cost of insur-
ance should correspond to its value or, more generally, that the
insurer should treat the whole body of policyholders in a reason-
able and fair manner. In this more general form it is not limited
to matters of price.
Swedish law also comprehended within the initial meaning of
76. Id. at 7; [1950] Svensk Fbrfattningssamling Nr. 320, § 282. It is
enforced with special emphasis in the automobile liability field.
77 See note 70 supra.
78. Starke, supra note 34, at 59
79 FouRAsTIE, op. cit. supra note 60, at 259.
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the principle the notion that there should be a fair distribution of
the costs of insurance among policyholders-that rate classifica-
tion should be rational and appropriate. Let us designate this ob-
jective as one of equity among policyholders. It also is very widely
accepted and is implemented in a variety of ways. Let us extend
it, also, to include matters other than price. In this sense, it re-
quires evenhanded treatment of policyholders.
Finally, there is a kind of aequum et bonunt not included within
either of the first two aspects. It is not a matter of reasonableness
between the company and the policyholders as a body, nor of
equity among various groups of policyholders, but is fairness
as between the company and an individual policyholder. Let us
call this the objective of fairness. It is implicit in many particular
regulatory provisions but is seldom, if ever, recognized as such.
1 Reasonableness Between Company and Policyholders
Two reciprocal aspects of this objective appear. On the one
side, social policy requires that the premium charges should be
reasonable so that insurance buyers pay only what the coverage is
worth. On the other side,, a complementary thrust of the objective
would require the company to define its coverage in a way that is
unambiguous and not unreasonably strict. This may be regarded
as ensuring that the insured gets what he pays for, or-going
somewhat further-as requiring the company to give the insured
what he must have assumed he was paying for. The narrower in-
terpretation would permit any constriction of coverage the com-
pany wished, provided only that the premium charges were ap-
propriately reduced. The broader meaning would focus on the
dangers of ambiguity, and might even place lower limits on the
definition of coverage-quite irrespective of ambiguity or of cor-
relative reduction in premiums-on the ground that such a limita-
tion of coverage would be misleading. In this extended sense the
goal of reasonableness might, in the short run, come into conflict
with the principle of solidity. In the long run, premiums could be
raised, in theory at least, to take account of any refusal of the
courts, or of the insurance commissioner, to honor limitations in
the policies.
The premium-limiting aspect of reasonableness is the principle
thrust of the Swedish principle of skdlighet. It is also a part of the
American statutory rule with respect to premiums in insurance
other than life, which prescribes that rates shall not be "excessive."
The insurance commissioner is charged to enforce the standard,
and in fact makes an effort to do so, though there is some disagree-
ment about the degree to which success is achieved.
In the United States, in contrast to Sweden, the principle of
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reasonableness is sought by express legal controls in fire and
casualty insurance but not in life insurance. Only in Wisconsin,
among American states, is there an explicit statutory upper limit
on life insurance premium rates.8" No doubt the difference is
more apparent than real, for competition in the United States is
strong enough that any reasonable limitation on initial premium
rates would be largely irrelevant. The Wisconsin limitation is so
liberal that it is doubtful if it has ever had any effect. Moreover,
the imperative demand for solidity, especially in the long-term life
contract, ensures that any tenable maximum figure must be higher
than premiums need to be for most companies. Secure operation
of a life company requires premiums large enough to produce sur-
pluses for distribution either to stockholders or to policyholders.
If the objective of reasonableness is to limit premium rates to a
reasonable figure, it can only be implemented, consistent with the
demands of solidity, in the Swedish way-by a restriction of divi-
dends to stockholders. No doubt this is not necessary so long as
a highly competitive market continues to exist, but when control
does seem necessary, a compulsory limitation on the amount of
distributions to stockholders would achieve the objective of rea-
sonableness far more effectively than does the Wisconsin law No
doubt such a solution would be vigorously attacked as "un-Ameri-
can" in some quarters, but it would only extend to the field of in-
surance a principle of control long accepted for public utilities.
It is worth noting, at this point, that there is considerable demand
in Sweden for the introduction of price competition into the life
insurance market, thus making the Swedish control somewhat more
like the American.
Premium rate limitations do not exhaust the possibilities of
the principle of reasonableness, even with respect to monetary
concerns. Thus, any statutory provisions which require non-for-
feiture benefits on lapse and which set maximum surrender charges
also constrain the companies to reasonable conduct in relation to
policyholders as a group. It is possible, however, that when a
company declines to give any benefits on lapse or when it charges
excessive surrender fees, it is being reasonable with the whole
body of policyholders but inequitable as among groups. Thus non-
forfeiture provisions have their most direct thrust in the preserva-
tion of equitable treatment among groups of policyholders.
One facet of reasonableness has achieved explicit recognition to
a very limited extent. There is some feeling that it is a proper
objective of regulation to seek efficiency or economy in the in-
80. See WIs. STAT. § 206.26 (1959) It should be noted that the German
control over rate minima, through the Gesclldftsplan, also provides con-
trol over rate maxima. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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surance market. This is not merely a matter of limiting entre-
preneurial profits, but a matter of limiting economic waste. In
the United States, for example, there have been occasional efforts
to limit the salaries of insurance executives; large salaries are
sometimes perceived as economically wasteful expenditure, and
therefore unfairly burdensome to policyholders.s The recent
Swedish development in which skalighet has come to include a
notion of efficiency or economy,' has not proceeded very far,
though there have been complaints about, or modest efforts made
to prevent, wasteful expenditures for agency conventions abroad,
for excessive traveling expenses, for special celebrations, for lux-
urious quarters, or for excessive amnemties for employees and for
executives.' In the United States, with its traditional wasteful-
ness, there has been little desire to enforce a policy of austerity.
In addition to occasional efforts (especially during the 1930's)
to limit salaries there has been some control over commission rates
in life insurance, but on the whole the notion of parsimony or
austerity is not a part of our insurance law. 4
Another aspect of reasonableness receives a great deal of at-
tention, especially in the United States and m Germany. I refer
here to the control of policy terms.' In the United States we
have uniform fire policies, and standard provisions m accident
and health insurance."6 In general, however, we have less control
over forms than the Germans, who have developed their technique
for working out policy forms to a fine art and have made it one
of the principal foci of the regulatory process. Control over
terms ensures both that coverage will be more precisely defined
and that restrictive clauses will not unfairly prejudice the policy-
holder, whether by making his bargain a bad one or by mislead-
mg him. As with us, approval of policy terms by the German
regulatory agency is a prerequisite to their use.8 ' But while with
81. See KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 172-73. This effort may
have a purely democratic objective instead. See text accompanying note
109 infra.
82. Though the notion of sparsamhet, or economy, is not strictly new,
see text accompanying note 73 supra, it has recently received additional
emphasis. See SrATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1960:11, op. cit. su-
pra note 63, at 211, 259.
83. As yet there has been little concrete action with respect to spar-
samhet, but I found it a topic which interested my informants in Stock-
holm in the spring of 1960, and the particulars I have listed were all
mentioned to me in interviews.
84. For examples of statutes aimed at limiting expenses, see Wis. STAT.
§§ 206.26-.31 (1959); N. Y. INS. LAw § 213.
85. In Sweden, the 1945 Commission was directed to consider this ques-
tion. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 6.
86. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1959) (fire policy); Wis. STAT.
§ 204.31 (1959) (accident and health).
87. Compare VAG § 5 with Wis. STAT. § 206.17 (1959).
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us the immense variety of submitted forms tends to render the
process of approval not much more than a formality in some lines
of insurance in some states, 8 with the Germans it has led to an
elaborate process of give-and-take between the industry and the
agency before there is initial approval of the forms.8 9 This leads
to a much higher degree of uniformity of policies among the
companies than exists with us, excepting those areas in which
standard policies have come into vogue.9" It also leads to policies
which are better drafted than many of ours, and perhaps tends to
decrease the amount of litigation.9"
This strong drive toward uniformity of policies has shifted the
area of competition from coverage-and especially from "gim-
micks"-to price and service, concepts which the individual policy-
holder can better understand. This result the Germans regard as
an objective in itself. They talk about the transparency of the
market (Markttransparenz) as one of the purposes of insurance
regulation.92 With us the same tendency is manifested in quite a
different way While the Germans push hard for the development
88. KIMBALL & CONKLIN, op cit. supra note 47, at 59 But see Kim-
ball & Hansen, The Utah Insurance Commissioner- A Study of Adminis-
trative Regulation in Action, Part 1I, 6 UTAH L. REV 1, 15 (1958)
89 This statement is based on extensive interviews with officials in
the Bundesaufsichtsarnt fir das Versicherungs- und Bausparwesen in Ber-
lin in the summer of 1960, together with examination of files involving the
development of new allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen (general terms
of insurance contracts) for approval by the agency Finke, Werbung und
Wettbewerb in der Versicherung (Karlsruhe) is a two-volume loose-leaf
service keeping various insurance law materials up to date for German
lawyers. Most of this service relates to the approved stipulations incorpo-
rated in the policies.
90. See Bischoff, Markttransparenz der A VB in der Sachverscherung
als Aufsichtsproblem des V 8(1) Ziff 2 in Verbmdung mit F1 13 VAG, in
[1956] VEROEFFENTLICHUNGEN DES BUNDESAUFSICHTSAMTES FUER DAS
VERSICHERUNGS- UND BAUSPARWESEN 33. Markttransparenz seems to in-
volve both the idea of comparability and that of uniformity See also
[1955] id. at 154; [1959] id. at 130; Knoll, Die Hagelversicherung, 2
FUENFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT 245, 273 (ed.
Rohrbeck 1952)
91. I have an impression that litigation over policy terms is less common
in Germany than in the United States, even in relation to population, on
the basis of conversations with people in the regulatory agency in Berlin.
However, exact comparison would be very difficult and not very helpful.
One could compare the number of American judicial opinions published in
the law reports with German opinions listed and classified in Oberstcht
iiber die Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des Privatversicherungsrechts"
(survey of decisions in the area of private insurance law), an annual fea-
ture of Zeitschrift fir die gesamte Versicherungswtssenschaft. However, in
neither country are all litigated cases reported. Thus the comparison would
be meaningless without much more information, which would be difficult
to obtain. Moreover, if one found that there was much less litigation over
the meaning of policy terms in Germany, it would still be uncertain what
that proves.
92. See authorities cited in note 90 supra.
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of contractual stipulations which are models of clarity and which
require no litigation in the administration of claims, our less cer-
tain contracts are interpreted by the courts under a principle of
construction which disfavors the companies (the contra profer-
entem principle)." Thus while our contracts are not unambigu-
ous, any uncertainties in them tend to be interpreted against the
company. The resultant of our approach is, therefore, much the
same as the end product of the German method. However, the
German method has the advantage of enabling the regulatory
agency, in examining policy terms, to give attention to the need
for solidity, a factor less likely to be considered by the American
court construing an ambiguous policy term.
2. Equity Among Policyholders
The aspect of aequum et bonum that I have called "equity"
is a notion that policyholders should be treated without unfair
discrimination. It is best illustrated m American law by the ex-
plicit requirement of the All-Industry laws9' that insurance pre-
mium rates shall not be "unfairly discriminatory." The require-
ment demands fair classification of policyholders for premium
computation m order that each person need carry only the cost
of his own insurance, so far as that can be worked out. No other
objective of insurance regulation is so difficult to apply. In some
sense every risk unit is unique and could be separately classified
and rated. To carry refined classification to this extreme would
be impossible for most lines, however. In the first place, an over-
refinement of risk classification would increase administrative cost.
In the second place, there is, in general, no way to measure risk
directly; one can only measure risk indirectly through loss statis-
tics which reflect experience with similar risks. Such statistics are
valid only if they are "credible," a condition which exists when the
collection of statistics is sufficiently large and dispersed that the
effects of chance are eliminated. To give the quality of credibility
to statistical data requires the combination in a single classifica-
tion of a large number of risk units, categorized on some a priori
93. For Wisconsin developments relating to contract interpretation, see
KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 210-12, 230-32 passim. The Germans
use the contra proferentemn principle too, using the term Die Unklarheiten-
regelung. Compare BRUCK-MOELLER, KOMmrNTAR ZUM VERSICRERUNGS-
VERTRAGSGESETZ UND ZU DEN ALLGEMEINEN VERSICHERUNGSBEDINGUN-
GEN 1:75-79 (8. Auflage 1953) with PROELSS, VERSICaERUNoSVEiRTRAoSE-
SETZ 18-25 (12. Auflage 1960).
94. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.1 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. INS.
LAw § 180. The Germans have dealt extensively with these problems under
the term Primzengerechtigkeit. See, e.g., a series of papers by Braess,
Fritz, Giese, Reichert-Facilides, Steinlin, and Wiinsche, in (1958] VEsi-
CHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFTLiCHES ARcmrv 257-333.
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basis. Thus it becomes apparent that a reasonable compromise
must be sought between refined classification and the need for
credibility in order to measure risk.95
The danger of inequity resulting from a priori classification is
easily illustrated. Not all categories for which considerable statis-
tical evidence can be developed are in fact sound, since the defining
characteristics chosen may have only a partial correspondence
with the true causal factors. For example, Negroes have often
been "rated up" in life insurance, based on the undeniable fact
that mortality experience for all Negroes is less favorable than
experience for all whites. 6 It requires little sophistication to ap-
preciate the danger in using these categories, for such factors as
a less favorable public health environment may well bias the
statistics. While reliance on the race classification will protect the
company, the classification is too crude, for it sweeps within the
disfavored class many who should receive more favorable treat-
ment. A desire to eliminate this particular inequity as in conflict
with fundamental moral notions about equal treatment of races
has led to statutes forbidding the use of race as a classification."
A more refined statistical apparatus which isolated and used the
true causal factors would probably exclude it too.
Any number of possible inequities result from the classifica-
tions used in the gathering of statistics for rate-making. The dis-
covery and validation of the appropriate categories which reach to
the heart of risk variation is a difficult matter, especially since the
search gets involved so easily in unrealized biases of the rate mak-
ers. For example, the grouping of all young drivers in the making
of rates for automobile liability insurance undoubtedly leads to
inequity against that large class of responsible youngsters who do
not contribute at all to the bad statistics of the below-25 group.9
To recognize the inequity of course is not to solve it; the problem
is a complicated one with which many able people have struggled.
Other practices may lead to discrimination against groups of
policyholders. For example, whole groups may be excluded from
coverage. If the company exercises a sound underwriting judgment
one cannot regard this conduct as discriminatory, but the com-
pany's standard of exclusion may not always be justifiable. Ex-
95. The 1945 Swedish Commission urged a balance between "simplicity
and equity." APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 13.
96. See MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 262 (1939)
97 See N. Y INS. LAW § 209(3), which dates from 1892. See also
Wis. STAT. § 942.04(c) (1959) (automobile insurance), Lange v Rancher,
262 Wis. 625, 56 N.W.2d 542 (1952) (state life insurance fund may not
make rate distinction on basis of race or color)
98. For a study of the general problem, see WILLIAMS, PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (1959) And see
Weekly Underwriter, Jan. 21, 1961, p. 18 (Carr speech)
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clusion of applicants from consideration on the ground of race or
color is one such standard that is of questionable validity. More-
over, when the companies think that rates are inadequate, as in
automobile liability insurance in the 1950's, the resulting strict
application of the company's selection criteria will drive large
numbers of "clean risks" into the assigned risk plan, where they
are surcharged. There are elements of unfair discrimination in this
exclusionary practice, and in 1960 there was developing concern
with the problem.99
Equitable treatment of policyholders depends not only upon a
fair application of underwriting standards and classifications re-
lated to the characteristics of the individual applicant but also
upon an absence of unfair discrimination among groups created
in other ways than by underwriting classification. One situation
where the problem arises is in the early development of a life in-
surance company. In order to develop surpluses and contingency
reserves that satisfy all of the demands of solidity, it may be neces-
sary to withhold money from distribution to the policyholders
who contributed it. This treats the policyholders who come into
the company early less favorably than those who come later. The
inequity is exacerbated by the fact that early policyholders take
some risk that the company may not succeed at all. Perhaps the
need for surpluses and contingency reserves can at least be mini-
mized, and thus solidity and equity made more compatible, by
operation with high premiums and correspondingly high divi-
dends. This would give the company its solidity through its re-
cuperative power, rather than through surpluses.
Competitive pressures may create the reverse inequity in the
early years of a new life insurance company In order to facilitate
the sale of policies by an unknown company, such companies
sometimes issue "founders' policies" which give the early policy-
holders an interest in a designated portion of the premium in-
come received from later policies. Though this has been support-
ed on the theory that the earlier policyholders bear a greater risk
99. The most extensive public statements of concern came from New
York. See, e.g., Address by Superintendent Thacher to the Insurance Law
Section of the New York State Bar Association, reported in Weekly Under-
writer, Feb. 6, 1960, p. 273. As a result New York developed new rules
governing use of the assigned risk plan, in an effort to minimize the use
of the plan and maximize the issuance of voluntary insurance. One method
was the provision of credit against assignments to the company for the vol-
untary insurance of drivers falling within certain classes. The New York
rules were announced in August, 1960. Weekly Underwriter, Aug. 13,
1960, p. 272. For reports on the problem, see Journal of Commerce,
Oct. 3, 1960, p. 9, and Weekly Underwriter, Oct. 1, 1960, p. 612. For
stories on efforts to control cancellation of automobile policies by legisla-
tive, enactment, see Journal of Commerce, Sept. 30, 1960, p. 10, and
Weekly Underwriter, July 30, 1960, p. 181.
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of failure of a new company, that is certainly not the theory on
which sales of founders' policies are based-most often the ap-
peals made are to the get-rich-quick impulse of the buyer
The recent development of minimum deposit insurance (which
is ordinary insurance with especially high early cash values, on
which buyers generally borrow to the limit) has been perceived
as inequitable treatment among various classes of policyholders.
Thus the New York Superintendent has said that:
When two policyholders who at the same age and condition have
bought essentially similar policies in the same amount from the same
company, one a minimum deposit policy and the other a conventional
type policy, surrender them at the end of the first policy year, a re-
turn of as much as 70% of the first year premium to one and a re-
turn of nothing to the other is inequitable. Such disparity is completely
inconsistent with the basic pnnciple that cash values of different plans
should bear a reasonable and regular relationship to each other. Ac-
cordingly, high early cash and loan values on minimum deposit poli-
cies insofar as they result from departures from the company's regu-
lar pattern used for determining the cash and loan values of other es-
sentially similar policies are considered unfairly discriminatory and
lend themselves to unsound and inequitable practices. 10 0
Even if such a plan were actuarially sound in itself, so that it
would be hard to regard it as inequitable as against other groups
of policyholders, there might still be inequity among buyers of
this policy The initial reserve needed to create the high cash value
in the first year can be met only with difficulty from the first
year premium. If part of it must be borrowed from surplus, then
even if the plan is actuarially sound with respect to the whole
group who participate in it, there is unfavorable treatment of the
policyholders who remain in the plan until maturity when com-
pared with those who die or allow their policy to lapse in early
years.
A large number of subtle and difficult problems of equitable
distribution of cost, especially in relation to distribution of sur-
plus, exist in connection with the actuarial laws in effect in the
United States and elsewhere. However, understanding of them de-
pends too much on an understanding of actuarial science for us
to explore them further here.'
100. WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, [1959] INSURANCE DEPARTMENT SERVICE
[for] NEW YoRK 6-7
101. For a perceptive discussion of some of these problems, see STATENS
OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. cit. supra note 60, at 63-79
(translated extract at 44-54) Another part of the insurance law project in
which I am engaged will seek to explore these problems in considerable
detail. Clearly, the problem of equitable treatment can exist in non-mone-
tary matters, though it is less common there. The German law prohibits
special advantages of all kinds, monetary or otherwise. See VAG § 81,
Abs. 2, Satz 3. This provision seeks to prevent inequity among groups of
policyholders; it also seeks fairness to individual policyholders.
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3. Fairness to Policyholders
Whereas the objective of reasonableness prohibits the mistreat-
ment of the whole body of policyholders, and that of equity the
mistreatment of policyholders in groups, the remaining objective
of fairness prohibits mstreatment of policyholders as individuals.
One of the most common examples of unfairness is in the handling
of claims. Some compames make a practice of being unduly strict
in claims payments or repeatedly insist on unmeritorious but avail-
able technical defenses. Likewise, some agents make misrepresen-
tations to individual policyholders or induce them to replace exist-
ing policies. Individualized misconduct presents difficult problems
of control, especially by a restructuring of the system of operation.
Instead one has to rely, in general, on unwieldy administrative
systems of enforcement akin to those developed for enforcement
of the criminal law.
There seems to be no inherent conflict between the objective of
fairness and the other objectives we have discussed so far. In prac-
tice, however, there may be conflict with the objective of solidity
whenever a legal agency such as a court loses sight of the objec-
tive of solidity in seeking to implement the objective of fairness.
Thus the construction of the insurance policy contra proferen-
ten (against the company) can lead in an individual case to an ex-
treme decision in favor of the policyholder that creates real dif-
ficulties for the security of the insurance fund. For example, if an
agent has made misrepresentations to a policyholder under cir-
cumstances that induce the court to hold the company responsible
for the misrepresentation, the consequence may be to make the
company pay a large sum outside the boundary of the coverage
upon which its premiums are based. Of course it is not abstract
fairness that produces this conflict, but its misapplication. Like-
wise, a decision reversmg a line of previous decisions may bring
a whole class of occurrences withn the policy coverage and create
difficulties for the fund. But if the company is making proper use
of reinsurance and has the resilience resulting from appropriate
contingency reserves and surpluses, then the conflict is less with
solidity than with equity, for subsequent rate increases will redress
the balance between the company and the whole body of policy-
holders, while putting later policyholders at a disadvantage in re-
lation to those who have already benefited from the unanticipated
coverage.
Thus far we have dealt with policy objectives intimately re-
lated to the internal operation of the insurance business. Without
reasonable implementation of these objectives, the business does
not operate well. We move now to the discussion of objectives
1961]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 471
that are essentially irrelevant to the proper operation of the in-
surance business but are imposed upon the business from without.
II. OBJECTIVES NOT NECESSARILY INHERENT IN
THE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE
Pressing in upon the insurance enterprise from without are all
of the goals of society at large. For the most part the insurance
business would work equally well whether these objectives were
implemented or not. This is so far true that regulatory officials
do not always recognize clearly that national economic policy, or
other general public policy, has any relationship to supervision.
Many officials in the German regulatory agency, for example,
responded to that specific question by asserting the irrelevance of
general economic or social policy considerations to problems of
regulation. There is no doubt of the sincerity of this belief; it is
especially noteworthy, therefore, that German regulatory officials
have applied such considerations in a number of situations.'
Nor is this surprising, upon reflection, given the intensity with
which certain social needs are felt. Some of the officials put it dif-
ferently, not saying that general economic and social policy is irre-
levant, but rather that it is for the Economics Minister or other of-
ficials in Bonn to consider, not for the regulatory agency No doubt
this is true, speaking generally In fact the Economics Minister
could determine policy for the regulatory agency, allowing general
national considerations to override the ordinary supervisory pnnci-
ples normally applied by the agency However, it does not seem
quite accurate to say that only Bonn officials can or do consider
such factors, as the illustrations in the preceding footnote demon-
strate-and as otherwise must be clear upon reflection, for insur-
ance supervision does not exist in a vacuum but in a complicated
twentieth-century state.
These general societal goals are pervasive demands which have
as much validity within the insurance institution as they have any-
102. For example, dunng World War II the Retchsaufflchtsamt (Reich
supervisory agency) sought to exclude coverage of the unborn offspring
of animals from slaughter-animal insurance (Schlachttierversicherung), the
theory was that such coverage would encourage the slaughter of animals
carrying young and was, therefore, contrary to the national food policy.
Vertffentlichungen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes fUr das Versicherungs- und
Bausparwesen, [1939-45] Geschiiftsbencht 34. Similarly the introduction
of insurance covering the enhanced value of property resulting from in-
flation (gleitende Neuweriversicherung) was resisted during the war on the
ground that it might lead to a loss of confidence in the Reichsmark. Id.
at 44-45. See also text accompanying notes 164-69 infra for the effect
of national policy on insurance investments, both in the United States and
in Germany. And see text accompanying notes 153-59 infra for a descrip-
tion of the "need test."
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where else. They are many and various, and it is difficult to clas-
sify them. For present purposes, I divide them into three groups,
though with an understanding that there are interrelations which
make this division somewhat artificial. One set of demands derives
mainly from our political structure and attitudes. A second comes
from economic and social policies that are not purely political. A
third group, in some sense more fundamental than either of the
first two, seeks to implement certain basic moral values. Let us
look at them under these three headings, recognizing that other
classifications may be equally useful. The present listing does not
exhaust the possibilities. Any motive or attitude that becomes
widespread may have an effect on insurance law, under appropn-
ate circumstances.0 3
A. GENERAL PUBLIC POLICIES-DEMANDS DERIVING FROM
POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND ATTITUDES
The policies suggested here are numerous, complex, and some-
times subtle. For some purposes it would be important to define
them far more precisely than is useful here, and perhaps even to
subdivide and differentiate them further. Without any effort to at-
tain precision, however, let us discuss the impact on insurance law
of four aims: democracy, liberty, local protectionism, and feder-
alism.
1. Democracy
If it seems curious to name democracy as one of the objectives
of insurance regulation, let it only be remembered how pervasive
is this ill-defined goal as a human aspiration. As used here, the
word refers primarily to egalitarian ideas, both in the social and
in the political sphere. The democratic or egalitarian purpose has
spilled over into insurance regulation, not only in a multitude of
subtle and indirect ways, but also in some rather explicit ones.
An egalitarian motif runs through much legislative action re-
specting local mutual insurance companies in the United States.
For many decades the Wisconsin legislature had repeatedly to con-
sider bills proposing to change the voting rule in town mutual
fire insurance companies from one based on the amount of insur-
ance carried to one in which each policyholder would have a sin-
gle vote.1 4 There was also a related effort, through legal limita-
tions on the use of proxy votes, to discourage domination of local
mutuals by management cliques and thus to preserve democratic
103. Holmes, J., dissenting m Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76(1905): "Every opinion tends to become a law."
104. KIMvBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71.
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values." 5 In the big commercial mutuals, the problem of de-
mocracy arose because management tended to become self-per-
petuating, aided by the difficulty of organizing opposition among
innumerable policyholders, widely scattered."0 6 As a result of the
investigations in 1905 and 1906,107 various statutes were passed
which sought to assure democratic control by policyholders, by re-
quiring the company to give certain types of assistance to dissident
groups seeking to overturn management, and by other means.0 s
It is doubtful that this statutory policy was ever implemented very
effectively-or that it could have been implemented without mak-
ing management too insecure, thereby threatening the value of
solidity Finally, there was an element of egalitarian thinking in the
efforts occasionally made to restrict executive salaries in the larger
insurance companies. 0 9
No doubt one would find the egalitarian motif running through
insurance law in many other countries as well, but let one spe-
cific illustration suffice. In Sweden, one purpose of the 1945 com-
mission's inquiry into insurance was "to safeguard a democratic
and social influence on all insurance activities.""' By a "demo-
cratic influence" the commission seems to have meant, among oth-
er things, that control of insurance organizations must not be
based solely upon property conceptions-that joint stock life in-
surance companies must provide policyholder representation on
their governing boards, and that mutuals must give reality to pol-
icyholder control. The commission felt that for stock companies
"the insured, or some organ representing them, should be entitled
to appoint one or more directors in addition to those elected by
the shareholders," as a "natural democratic claim.""' The com-
panies were to be given an opportunity to work out the method
of providing such representation, subject to the government's pow-
er to intervene when necessary to protect the interests of the in-
sured." 2 The government has in fact intervened, and has made
much use of its power to appoint directors to represent the policy-
holders, with very little objection from the companies."' To some
105. Id. at 72.
106. Id. at 72-74.
107 The Armstrong investigation in New York was only the best known
of the investigations. For accounts of the Armstrong investigation, see au-
thorities cited in note 23 supra. For the Wisconsin and other investigations,
see authorities cited in note 24 supra.
108. KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73. See also authorities cited in
note 24 supra.
109 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
110. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 5-6.
111. Id. at 17 And see generally id. at 15-18.
112. Id. at 17-18.




extent, there has been a tendency to use this power as a means of
providing increased income to government officials serving in po-
sitions for which the prevailing salaries are felt to be inadequate;
of course this does not mean that the appointees cannot make as
important a contribution to the companies as other directors.
However, many of the appointees have been Social Democrats, a
fact not likely to make the most conservative among the insurance
men happy. 4
Despite the fact that the power of control remains in the board
members selected by the stockholders, there seems little doubt of the
impact of this move for "democratization" of insurance company
management. Regular board members will naturally be wary of
suggesting company action that would lead to demands for fur-
ther reform, a possibility ever-present in the minds of insurance
men who contemplate the presence of a government-appointed
member of the board. 5
2. Liberty
For present purposes, this heading includes all attitudes that
result in restraints on government interference with companies or
individuals in the insurance business. It has many facets, including
those restraints on official action that are substantive in character,
as well as those that are procedural. Some of the restraints-par-
ticularly those that are procedural-are constitutionally imposed,
while many others merely reflect current attitudes about the prop-
er limits of governmental action. I shall merely illustrate a few of
the implications of libertarian ideas for insurance law, without
making any effort to deal with them exhaustively.
At the level of pure procedure, it seems clear that insurance
regulation would be more effective if the insurance department
were free to act on the basis of probability and to refuse licenses
to company or agent without the apparatus of notice and hearing.
Although that statement would be applicable to the regulation of
any business, it is particularly true in the insurance business, which
consists of a multitude of individual transactions, most of them
very small. Though the sacrifice in supervisory effectiveness re-
sulting from the requirements of notice, hearing, and adequate
114. The last two sentences are based on interviews in Stockholm in
May, 1960, with various responsible and knowledgeable people connected
with Swedish insurance, supplemented by later correspondence.
115. The development of the principle of skillighet would seem to indi-
cate that these men have some basis for fearing further governmental inter-
vention. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra. In Wisconsin, in the
wake of the insurance investigation of 1906, there was a proposal that the
Governor appoint one director of domestic mutual life companies. Nothing
came of it. See KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 74.
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proof is considerable, and though there is a very high probability
that an unfettered administrator would not be wrong very often,
the sacrifice seems a small price to pay for freedom from arbitrary
action by a public official. There is even some doubt whether we
have gone far enough in devising controls over the procedures in
the insurance departments. Liberty ranks so high in our scale of
values that we willingly suffer-and should suffer-many limita-
tions on the effectiveness of our control machinery rather than
acquiesce in official arbitrariness."'
The objective of liberty has other facets than mere insistence
on procedural restraint. There is, for example, a widespread no-
tion that compulsion itself is an evil, and that we should only sup-
press action widely regarded as undesirable and of considerable
moment. It is better for society to suffer slight harms than to
suppress them forcibly In part this is probably a result of a feeling
that it is immoral to compel, but it also reflects a wise skepticism
about the capacity of human beings to make sound decisions, and
a judgment that that society is sounder which provides for a very
broad dispersion of decision-making power. This element of the
liberal democratic faith seems a sound principle to apply to insur-
ance. It takes maximum advantage of the wisdom, the integrity,
and the sense of responsibility of persons in the industry, mainly
116. See Kimball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing,
61 COLUM. L. REV 141-200 (1961) for a discussion of some such
problems. The Scandinavian institution of the Justitieombudsmannen is an
interesting contribution to the science of controlling official discretion. The
Onbudsrnannen is a parliamentary commissioner whose specific job it is to
seek out and punish arbitrary action by public officials, thus protecting
the citizen against the government. The institution dates back to 1810 in
Sweden. Although the Ombudsmannen has apparently never had to take
action respecting the insurance inspectorate, the extent of his activity can be
judged by the fact that in Sweden in 1959 he received 780 complaints and
initiated 223 actions of his own. Out of these, 5 prosecutions were begun,
8 recommendations were made for changes in the law, and 247 admonitions
were administered to officials. Press release prepared by Swedish Royal
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 1, 1957, supplemented by typed informa-
tion dated June 1, 1960. Another important factor in controlling official
action in Sweden is the fact that most documents and letters of an agency
are accessible to the public.
German regulation provides for a considerable measure of control over
official discretion. Most decisions of the Bundesaufsichtsarnt are considered
to be Verwaltungsakte (administrative acts), subject to review in the Bun-
desverwaltungsgericht. See, e.g., PROELSS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 579. The
areas of free discretion are strictly limited, and even there the systematic
character of German regulatory practice tends constantly to narrow the
range of discretion by establishing precedents within the agency itself. The
sections of the VAG which in terms provide wide discretionary power, such
as §§ 81, 81a, 89, tend to be viewed rather restrictively by the officials
in the agency Interviews with regulatory officials in Berlin, summer, 1960.
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relying on nonlegal rather than legal means to provide control
over them."7
There are elements of both the wisdom of procedural restraint
and the benefit of wide dispersion of decision-making power in
the fact that in insurance regulation a serious effort has been made
to bring representatives of the regulated industry into even the
official decision-making process. This is sound, though it must be
done in such a way as to avoid industry domination of the super-
visory agency All systems seem to do this informally; in some sys-
tems there are also formal efforts to achieve participation. For
example, the Germans have the Beirat, an advisory body es-
tablished by the basic statute, to bring experts representative of
the insurance industry, of insurance buyers, and of other social and
economic groups into the regulatory process. 1"8 New York has
an insurance board, appointed by the governor, which has at
times been a useful adjunct to the regulatory process." 9
Control of conduct often involves creation of an elaborate ad-
ministrative mechanism, which is expensive and cumbersome and
may have collateral consequences violative of other important
objectives. There is no sound argument against trying to solve
serious problems, but there is an unanswerable argument for trying
to anticipate the consequences of all proposed solutions. One may
suggest, for example, that a requirement of pnor approval of
premium rates may tend either to compel a perfunctory (and
therefore wasteful) process of approval or to make adjustment of
rates difficult and slow, thereby threatening the solidity of insur-
ers--or making it difficult to equalize the burdens among groups
of policyholders, and thus challenging the very values it sought to
promote. In Germany, where the regulatory agency must usually
give explicit approval to the purchase of real estate, I learned from
interviews in one city that some real estate brokers often refrained
from offering available land to insurance companies because of
the inevitable delay consequent on the requirement of official
approval of the purchase.
The English carry the distaste for compulsion and for cumber-
some administrative machinery as far as anyone. They rely very
heavily on self-regulation by the business, on a sense of moral re-
sponsibility in the English business community, and on publicity.
117 STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, 1946:34, op. cit. supra note
60, at 35-37 (translated extract at 17-19), has some perceptive comments.
118. VAG § 92. See PROLSS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 57-62 (and index
under Beirat). See also GESAMTVERBAND DER VERSICHERUNGSWIRTSCHAPT
E.V., 12. GESCHAEFTSBERiCHT [1959/60] at 119-20, for a discussion of
the activity of the Beirat from the industry viewpoint.
119. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 19.
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A mere handful of people in the Board of Trade, no more than a
score at most, regulate insurance in one of the world's most im-
portant insurance markets.
Thus far we have seen some of the procedural aspects of liber-
tarian attitudes. But liberty goes to substance as well. Notions of
freedom of contract and of vested rights sometimes create diffi-
cult problems for the regulation of a business so complex as insur-
ance. For example, if a mutual company has been operating on an
actuarially unsound basis, the idea that policyholders have vested
rights in the benefits promised by the contract-irrespective of
the state of the company treasury-makes it difficult to adjust to
a sound basis without a reorganization, because to do so violates
vested rights in the contracts. This was a serious problem with
fraternal insurance companies in this country during the early
decades of this century, for they had begun in the nineteenth cen-
tury on an actuarially unsound basis and only later desired to con-
vert to a sound basis of operation with as little formality as pos-
sible.'20 Perhaps some European countries do not feel these
values so strongly, or perhaps they appreciate more fully the dif-
ficulties created by an extreme emphasis on the sanctity of vested
rights. The willingness in Sweden to limit life insurance profits to
a percentage of original investment is one illustration of the
European attitude. 12' Another is the German willingness to per-
mit unilateral alteration of contracts, not only during the inflation-
ary period of the early 1920's, but even more generally, in the
name of the Versichertengemeinschaft, or insured community 12
Altogether it seems clear that our attitudes toward liberty do
have considerable impact on insurance law and regulation, and
should have. There is no reason to isolate insurance from the rest
of society
3 Local Protectionism
In its most important aspect, insurance is a handmaiden of
commerce, and as such is essentially national or even international
in the scope of its activity Yet the operation of the insurance en-
terprise has been severely handicapped at times by localistic re-
strictions on its activities. By localistic restrictions I mean some-
thing other than the diversity of regulatory systems. I mean es-
sentially a policy of subjecting foreign companies to disadvan-
tages in relation to domestic companies. Such a policy is especially
120. See KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 156-62.
121. Interviews in Stockholm in May, 1960.
122. See Biichner, supra note 12, at 21-24; VAG § 81a. The principle
of equity requires such adjustment. On Verstchertengeniemschaft, see note
35 supra.
INSURANCE REGULATION
incongruous in the Umted States, the prototype of all continental
customs unions, where historically there has been only a minimum
of apparatus for the harassment of economic enterprise at political
boundary lines. Yet in the United States there have been many
manifestations of this kind of local public policy, inconsistent
though it may be with the larger interests of the insurance busi-
ness and even of the local communities themselves.
Among innumerable illustrations of a policy of localism, per-
haps the most striking is the Robertson law, enacted in Texas in
1907123 and then unsuccessfully proposed very widely in the
United States."i The Robertson law was intended to discourage
the outflow of capital from the state by requiring life insurance
companies to invest at least 75 per cent of the legal reserve for
policies on Texas citizens in Texas securities and real estate. The
Robertson law led to the withdrawal of about two dozen insur-
ance companies from Texas.'i One cannot be confident about
the economic consequences of such a statute, and they may be
much less than insurance men have supposed, but industry spokes-
men made strong assertions that the Robertson law and industry
reaction to it diverted capital from Texas to Oklahoma and Louisi-
ana. 6 In any case the statute probably was not necessary, since
capital tended to be invested in the state in larger amounts than
the statute required.
It was not only American states that had such a policy. The
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company is said to have
withdrawn from Canada in 1878 because of similar investment
restrictions."
123. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 170, now TEx. INS. CODE, art. 3.33 (1952).
124. Robert L. Cox, a vice-president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, stated m 1924 that since the 1907 legislative session, when the
law was passed in Texas, 104 bills had been introduced in 33 legislatures
in 18 years, all proposing the Robertson law. All had failed. Cox, "Statutory
Direction of Life Insurance Investments with Special Reference to the
Robertson Law of Texas," Address to Association of Life Insurance Presi-
dents, Dec. 12, 1924.
125. Ibid.
126. See, e.g., Alfred Hurrell, Attorney for Association of Life Insurance
Presidents, "The Call for Investments," Address to South Carolina Bankers'
Association, July 5, 1912; Robert L. Cox, General Counsel and Manager,
Association of Life Insurance Presidents, "A Trial Test of Compulsory
Investment Legislation, Economic Results under the Robertson Insurance
Law of Texas," Address to Texas Welfare Commission at Dallas, May 16,
1912; Cox, "The Geographical Distribution of the Investments of Life
Insurance Companies," Address to Association of Life Insurance Presidents,
April 2, 1909; Cox, supra note 124. The foregoing addresses are all avail-
able in the Library of the Insurance Society of New York.
127. WILLIAMSON & SMALLEY, NORTHvESTERN MUTUAL LIFE: A CEN-
TURY OF TRUSTEESHIP 74 (1957). The law was 40 Vict. c. 42, § 7 (1877)
(Can.).
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Discriminatory taxation also manifests local protectionisn.,
But there are limits to the advantages a state can give its domestic
companies by tax differentials. If the state has important domes-
tic companies, they will seek to gain a share of the national or
at least the regional market. There the domestic company will meet
retaliatory statutes which impose on it any burdens imposed by its
domicile on out-of-state companies. The universality of retaliatory
statutes ensures that the domestic company will pay taxes in other
states at least as high as the tax burden imposed on out-of-state
companies by its domiciliary state. If the domiciliary state is a
high-tax state, the domestic company will be put at a competi-
tive disadvantage, for it will pay those high taxes everywhere,
while its competitors from low-tax states will pay the high taxes
only in those states where they are directly imposed. This curious
problem sometimes leads to protectionism of an inverse sort. For
example, the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, domi-
ciled in Wisconsin, has been a leading national company for nearly
a century During the last third of the nineteenth century, Wiscon-
sin was a fairly high-tax state. In order not to prejudice the North-
western Mutual in its national aspirations, the state followed a
policy of taxing domestic companies (i.e., Northwestern) more
heavily than it taxed foreign companies. It did this with the ac-
quiescence of the company, which only ceased to be willing to
undergo discriminatory treatment at home (in order to avoid re-
taliation abroad, while providing the state with needed revenue at
home) when Wisconsin ceased to compare so unfavorably with
most other states on premium taxation.2 9
Local protectionism on occasion rears its head in the interna-
tional sphere, especially with respect to ocean marine insurance.
Often this is related to, or is consequent upon, important national
defense or foreign relations policies. The Merchant Ship Sales Act
of 1946, for example, pointed to the necessity for "efficient Ameri-
can-owned facilities for marine insurance" in order to attain
national security and develop our foreign commerce.lao In 1946
the Maritime Commission promulgated a rule requiring ship op-
erators who get a subsidy from the United States, and operators of
vessels acquired under a United States mortgage, to place "not
128. In Prudential Ins. Co. v Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), the Su-
preme Court upheld a South Carolina tax of three per cent on out-of-state
insurance companies, though domestic companies did not have to pay a
similar tax. The extent to which discriminatory taxation is possible under
the authorization given the states to tax insurance by the McCarran Act is
not entirely clear from this case. Presumably there are some limits.
129 The history of this problem is treated in detail in KIMBALL, op Cit.
supra note 1, at 259-70.
130. 60 Stat. 41 (1946), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1735-46 (1958)
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less than 75 per cent of the required hull insurance in the Ameri-
can market."13' This rule was modified but extended in 1956.
-132
Serious criticism of the protective rule, expressed in the 1960 re-
port of the O'Mahoney committee investigating ocean marine in-
surance,13 seems to underestimate the importance of other public
policies besides the reasonableness in price sought by the commit-
tee through the preservation of a highly competitive market. While
all instances of local protectionism, whether domestic or inter-
national, are suspect and should be supported only after the most
careful and skeptical examination, in the international sphere the
overriding importance of national security and other values may
make it desirable to place some artificial restrictions on the insur-
ance market. 34 At least a policy of retaliation may be necessary
to protect the right if not the duty of American shippers to buy in-
surance in the American market, as against foreign localizing re-
strictions.:3 5
4. Federalism
If the question were still undetermined, it is quite possible that
American insurance regulation would develop at the federal level.
Certainly during portions of our history, insurance company
spokesmen and others have urged regulation at that level, partly
on the ground of simplicity and partly on the ground of effective-
131. The Insurance Industry, Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 57 before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 5637-43 (1960); Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The
Insurance Industry, S. REP No. 1834, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 102-03
(1960).
132. Hearings, supra note 131, at 5640-42; REPORT, supra note 131,
at 105.
133. REPORT, supra note 131, at 108.
134. One interesting possibility, the effects of which would be too small
to weigh very heavily, is suggested by the recent proposal of an American
insurance man urging localistic restrictions as a measure to slow the gold
outflow from the United States. N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 62, col. 7.
See also McHugh, "The Challenge to State Regulation of Insurance," Ad-
dress to South Carolina Insurance Forum, Feb. 1, 1961, at p. 12 (mimco-
graphed text).
135. At the end of 1960, -American marine underwriters were protesting
to the State Department a threatened Venezuelan Government action to
prohibit importers from placing marine insurance with non-Venezuelan
underwriters. See, e.g., Journal of Commerce, Dec. 2, 1960, p. 2; Id.,
Dec. 9, 1960, p. 9. For further discussion of localism as a factor in insur-
ance law, see KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 270-80.
All manifestations of local protectionism are abhorred in insurance cir-
cles in London. Complexities in regulation are also disliked, for English
insurers are subject to difficulty because of the variety and cumulative im-
pact of measures that, taken alone, seem reasonable and modest. A re-
quirement of a security deposit as a condition to doing business is one il-
lustration. Security deposits are usually reasonable enough, taken individual-
ly, but in the aggregate they are very burdensome.
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ness. Half a century and more ago, the prevailing opinion seemed
to favor federal regulation.' 36 With the passage of time, insur-
ance men generally have shifted their views and would now favor
the present system of state regulation by an overwhelming ma-
jority, despite the complexity and cumbersomeness of that sys-
tem.13 They often put their preference on ideological grounds
(i.e., states' rights), but one is entitled to wonder if behind the
change in viewpoint is the spectre of the wide-ranging and gen-
erally effective twentieth-century federal agency The opinion fav-
oring state control persists despite the South-Eastern Underwriters
case, which made it clear that insurance regulation was within the
sweep of the commerce power 13 An added factor now is the ex-
istence of well-established insurance departments in every state,
each with a continuing vested interest in state regulation. There
has also grown up a national association of state insurance depart-
ments which exerts every effort in favor of continued state juris-
diction.139
This is not the place to reach a conclusion on the merits of
state versus federal regulation of insurance. That question is not
an easy one to answer, for there are strong arguments on both
sides. A federal agency would probably be more effective than
most of the state departments, though perhaps not more effective
than the best. To the extent that state regulation is ineffective in
any state, that state's citizens are subjected to risk of loss from
inept or venal management of insurance companies. It is probably
no accident that one of the stronger recent statements in favor of
federal regulation came from an attorney who supervised the liqui-
dation of one of the most seriously mismanaged insurance com-
panies of our day 140 The smaller state departments are incapable
of detecting dangers in the structure or operation of such com-
panies, even if the laws under which they operate give them suf-
ficient power. A possible solution to the problem within the frame-
work of state regulation is for the smaller states voluntarily to rely
much more than they do upon the services performed by the larg-
er states. Unfortunately there is reluctance to do so. Of course,
federal control gives no absolute assurance of superior effective-
136. See Huebner, Federal Supervision and Regulation of Insurance, 26
ANNALS 681, 682-86 (1905)
137 See, e.g., 2 NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, [1959] PROCEEDINGS
460-61.
138. United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944)
139 See, e.g., the activities of the Preservation of State Regulation
Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, re-
ported in 2 NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMm'RS, op. cit. supra note 137, at
457-63, and in other volumes passim.
140. See Journal of Commerce, May 25, 1960, p. 10.
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ness; federal agencies too can be weak, ineffective, subject to
improper influence, or even corrupt.
Doubtless federal regulation would be less expensive than state
regulation in the aggregate, for there is a large amount of dupli-
cation in the present regulatory effort among the states.' TheGerman regulatory agency does an effective job of regulation for
all of West Germany with a staff smaller than those of our larger
state insurance departments.4 2
Yet one has not exhausted the arguments when he has discussed
the relative economy and effectiveness of federal and state regula-
tion. The values of federalism lie in the wide dispersion of de-
cision-making power and in the probable enhancement of democ-
racy and liberty by such dispersion of power, especially in a com-
plex and diverse society such as ours. In part the decision on
federal versus state regulation of insurance must turn on such ab-
stract considerations of political theory; in part it must depend
upon the concrete practical considerations of economy and effec-
tiveness. 4 '
B. GENERAL PUBLIC POLICIES-DEMANDS DERIVING FROM
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY
Insurance does not exist in a vacuum, but in a complex modern
society with a developed and dynamic economy. The industrializa-
tion and urbanization of modern life, with the attendant deteriora-
tion of such social institutions as the extended family which were
141. Companies must comply separately with the laws of each of the
states in which they operate, and make separate reports to each. More-
over, they are subject to multiple examinations. The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners has made great contributions to the simplifica-
tion of this complex situation, by a system of convention examinations, by
convention forms, and by the development of uniform laws and practices,
but much complexity remains.
142. It is not entirely apt to compare the problems of the United States
with those of Germany. If one compares the United States with the whole
of Europe, the comparison becomes more favorable to the United States.
In Europe, problems of diversity of insurance law and regulation are being
attacked through committees of the Organization for European Economic
Corporation (OEEC) and the Common Market, and in the EUROPEAN
Conferences of Supervising Services of Insurance Companies. For the
achievements of the OEEC on insurance, see ORG. FOR EUROPEAN
ECON. Co-op., CODE OF LIBERALISATION 33, 111-21 (August 1959). (For
reservations to the code, see id. at 127-39.) And compare the Records of
the Third European Conference of Supervising Services of Insurance Com-
panies, Rome, October 1-5, 1956, with the Proceedings of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners for any year. Some current sugges-
tions to ameliorate the diversity are central security deposits, or cautions,
and reciprocity with respect to certificates of solvency.
143. Any evaluation of federal versus state regulation must inquire deep-
ly into the German experience and compare it with the American expe-
rience.
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of vital importance in generations gone by, have brought pressing
social problems which cry aloud for solution. In many of them, in-
surance can be made to play a key role. If insurance is to be util-
ized in solving such problems, the impact on the law and regula-
tion of insurance will be substantial. Let us outline public policy
as it relates to socialization of risk, freedom of enterprise, and
the process of capital accumulation.
1 Socialization of Risk
I have already suggested that insurance is a central institution in
contemporary society, having replaced prior basic institutions as
the way of providing for the pervasive security demands of the
human being. One would expect considerable pressure from so-
ciety at large to compel the insurance institution to do fully the
job for which it exists.
If insurance is to carry out fully its role in our society-if it is
to provide security and the sense of security on a broad basis-it
must include almost everyone, at least in certain key fields. Pres-
sure for the extension of insurance coverage is an aspect of what
one may call, very loosely, the socialization of risk. The desirability
of extending coverage may transcend purely economic considera-
tions. As one Swedish observer has put it:
The frequently urgent social alms of insurance-especially of persons
-urges its extension also to fields or groups of the population in
which acquisition is uneconomical to the insurer. Social demands must
then to some extent take precedence of financial motives. 4
One needs only to point to some of the twentieth century de-
velopments in this field to make the point sufficiently for present
purposes. The development of workmen's compensation, unem-
ployment compensation, bank deposit insurance, the pressure for
universalization of automobile liability insurance, as manifested by
financial or safety responsibility acts, by unsatisfied judgment
funds, by compulsory insurance, and by voluntary uninsured
motorist clauses to forestall further development of compulsory in-
surance, all have the same underlying significance.1'6 The in-
surance institution is being compelled, in one way or another, to
do its job completely The contemporary drive to expand social
security to provide medical care for the elderly is yet another illus-
tration.146  The professional, conservatively onented insurance
man resents the solutions involving government participation and
seeks to exorcise the demon by magical incantations-by denying
144. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 10.
145. See id. at 20-21 (obligatory insurance in Sweden)
146. See N. Y Times, Jan. 11, 1961, p. 18, col. 3; N.Y Times, Jan. 12,
1961, p. 28, col. 1 (editorial) Cf. Weekly Underwriter, Jan. 14, 1961, p. 5.
INSURANCE REGULATION
the use of the good word "insurance" to describe the bad develop-
ment.147 But insurance is the contemporary manifestation of
man's search for security, which demands the extension of insur-
ance to protect the whole society in the way that the primitive kin-
ship system did. Though our pattern of development is much like
that of Europe, the Europeans have either seen more clearly than
we the social implications of insurance activity or are less disturbed
by the change it foreshadows. The 1945 Swedish Commission
said, for example:
A wide extension of contingency insurance appears highly desirable
from the point of view of the community. This applies especially to
contingencies that would otherwise cause insuperable financial diffi-
culties to individuals, or permanently interfere with private enter-
prise. The responsibility not only for the security of individual citi-
zens, bpt also for our economic life, rests with the community in gen-
eral. An important duty m that respect must be to promote the sound
and appropriate development of contingency insurance.' 4s
The pressure for providing insurance solutions for complex so-
cial problems has had much impact on insurance law. Converse-
ly, the existence and widespread use of insurance has had many
consequences for other branches of law. 49
If socialization of risk is viewed as an objective of insurance
regulation, it at once alters the basic focus of the enterprise from
one essentially private (albeit subject to control in the public in-
terest) to one which is essentially public, pernutted to exist in pri-
vate form only to the extent that it fulfills society's demands. De-
spite all our predilections to the contrary, it seems a fact that the
basic focus of the enterprise is changing-subtly and gradually,
but inexorably-and the new and pervasive demands of society
are becoming more influential.
Automobile liability insurance is a good illustration. It seems
to be social policy to encourage or even to require that automobiles
be covered by insurance, in order to provide a solvent defendant
for victims to sue. Obviously, it then becomes necessary to pro-
vide an insurance market for all drivers whom the state permits
to drive. This produces the assigned risk plan, and compulsion on
the company to insure. At this point insurance begins to look like
147. For example, in 1959 the National Association of Life Underwrit-
ers passed a resolution calling upon Congress to delete all insurance ter-
minology from the Social Security Act, to change the name of the program,
and to take steps to ensure that it is not represented to be "insurance."
Weekly Underwriter, July 11, 1959, p. 49, 72.
148. APPELTOFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 20.
149. This is especially true in tort law. See, e.g., 2 HARPER & TAMES,
Tim LAW Op TORTS 759-84 (1956) for an introduction to these complex
problems.
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a public utility 150 The consequences of this change are immense.
If it is urgently required that insurance be available to all comers,
it is more difficult to implement with the same degree of ef-
fectiveness the basic objective of solidity of the enterprise, or even
the less crucial but important objective of equity among policy-
holders. Libertarian objectives are challenged. All must be quali-
fied by the overriding needs of society If solidity is endangered,
public subsidies or public guarantees are not far behind. If sub-
sidies are required, considerations of equity give way to conven-
ience to the tax gatherer. The public policy with which we are
dealing leads to serious conflicts of important values. The agencies
that make and enforce public policy must reach a resolution of
such conflicts by balancing the disparate demands which we seek
to elucidate here.
2 Freedom of Enterprise
There is no reason that a cartelized insurance industry could
not operate both safely and fairly, so far as policyholders are con-
cerned, without providing freedom of access to the market for
new insurers. Indeed it might operate with more stability and so-
lidity than a highly competitive enterprise, though regulation might
then be necessary to ensure reasonableness of prices to the in-
sured. However, in American society at least, freedom of access to
the market for new entrepreneurs is itself regarded as a value of
considerable importance. As a result, it is characteristic of Ameri-
can insurance regulation to provide only general standards for ad-
mission to the market, standards difficult to meet in an earlier pe-
riod of capital scarcity but modest in mid-twentieth century New
business units now come into the business easily and in large
numbers.'
In many other systems a policy of freedom of access to the
market either is given less effect or is repudiated. In Sweden, for
example, the government concession or license which is necessary
to do business in the country is granted only under rather restric-
tive rules. New institutions and foreign companies seeking a place
150. See California Auto Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v Maloney,
341 U.S. 105 (1951) (upholding constitutionality of compulsory assigned
risk program), 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw 450 (1952)
(discussion of statutes forbidding rejection of applications by compensation
insurers) See also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Connor, 207 N.Y.S.2d 679,
170 N.E.2d 681 (1961)
151. See Cartwright, column in National Underwriter, Nov 4, 1960, p.
43, talking in disparaging terms of the "continuing cascade of [new] pro-
motions." E.g., from the end of 1950 to mid-1959 life insurance companies
in the United States increased in number from 650 to 1402. This was a
net increase. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at
97-98.
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in the market must show that they are needed and that they are
likely to promote sound insurance practice. In general, new com-
panies are not admitted to do business along traditional lines un-
less the particular field is unsaturated; companies advancing new
ideas may be admitted, however. Moreover, there is a current
trend (which has been encouraged by the regulatory agency) to-
ward the merger of existing firms in order to minimize any un-
toward effects of excessive competition, such as the alleged in-
crease in marketing costs."52 One thing is clear-the tight con-
trol of entrance into the market makes it much easier to control
other aspects of the market than is the case in the United States,
where access is open and frequently utilized.
In Germany, a "need test" was enacted into law in 1937.'
The determination of need was to be made by the regulatory
agency in accordance with principles enunciated by the Economics
Minister of the Reich. A set of instructions from the Minister in
the same year gave a strict reading to the need test, with especial
attention to be given to the needs of the total economy." Since
the war, the provision establishing a need test has continued to be
expressed in the statute, just as it was originally stated in 19 3 7 ."'
The validity of the provision seems now to depend upon whether
it has been impliedly repealed as inconsistent with Article 12 of
the new German Constitution. 56 In the mid-1950's the German
Federal Constitutional Court decided a series of important cases
interpreting that article.157 Many German lawyers, including the
152. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 6. And see STUDY OF
INSURANCE SUPERVISION, SWEDEN 8-9 (1960), a mimeographed statement
m English prepared by the Frrsiikrings Inspektionen. Officials in the regula-
tory agency say they would stop the merger tendency before it resulted in
undue restriction of competition. The 1945 Commission also favored a pol-
icy of restriction of access to the market. APPELTOFFT, op. cit. supra
note 62, at 11, 18.
153. Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes 0iber die Beaufsichtigung der
privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen und Bausparkassen, vom 5. Mairz
1937, art. I, § 2(b), [1937] Reichsgesetzblatt 1:269 (Ger.). The original
regulatory law had provided that granting of a license was independent of
need. See § 5 of statute cited supra note 15.
154. Blichner, supra note 12, at 31; PROELSS, op. cit. supra note 49.
155. VAG § 8, as reprinted In PROELSS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 132.
156. Grundgesetz fUr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [1949] Bundes-
gesetzblatt 1, 2. See also PRoELSS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 152-54. Before
the new Constitution, there was a question whether the need test was in-
effective because in conflict with the principe of free competition which
was, m some sense, basic law in the western occupation zones. Bflchner,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 31. The earlier story of the need test in Germany
is extensively treated in Finke & Pfeiffer, supra note 52, at 111-23.
157. See PROELSS, op. cit. supra note 49, at 152-54. The department's
reaction to the development at the time it took place can be seen in
Ver6ffentlichungen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes fidr das Versicherungs- und
Bausparwesen, Geschtiftsberichte [1952/53] at 25; id. [1953/54] at 15;
id. [1954/55] at 14.
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President of the regulatory agency, 15s now believe that the
law is clear and that the need test no longer has any effect. Until
its 1954-1955 report, however, the regulatory agency seems to
have felt that the provision was still law, albeit somewhat quali-
fied and to be applied with great restraint.'59 Even if the need
test, as such, were no longer valid, the department felt it had some
control over the admission of insurers because of the threat to
solvency implied in an overcrowded market. It would only have
exercised such power in extreme cases, however. Since 1955 the
department has not mentioned the question in its official reports.
The "need test" is not the only place where varying attitudes
about relative freedom of enterprise may manifest themselves in
insurance regulation. For example, one of the requisites of safe
and solvent operation of life insurance companies is the computa-
tion of reserves on a conservative basis. Arguing from this position,
well-established life insurance companies have often urged the
compulsory computation of the legal reserve on the "full net level
premium" basis. By tlxs is meant, for present purposes, that the
contribution to the reserve of the first premium must be approxi-
mately the same as in subsequent years. However, the way the life
insurance business operates leads to a very heavy concentration of
expenses in the first year, including both the special expenses of
getting the policy on the books and the largest part of the soliciting
agent's commission-ordinarily about half of the initial premium.
The result is that the mortality or insurance cost for the first year,
plus the first-year expenses, plus the full tabular reserve required
by the full net level premium plan, is substantially in excess of thd
first year premium. This creates a problem of equity among policy-
holders which we have already discussed. It also creates a problem
of solidity, perhaps not so great for large, well-established com-
panies with big surpluses (for they can borrow the excessive ex-
penditure from surplus and repay it in the future years of the
policy) but very serious for new companies for which the drain on
surplus may be too large to bear. The result of a statute prescribing
the use of the full net level premium reserve is to give a competi-
tive advantage to the established companies. Modified reserve
plans are available which take account of the way the life insur-
ance business operates and make it unnecessary to contribute such
large amounts to the reserve in the initial year. All are actuarially
158. Letter to the author dated Feb. 24, 1961.
159 See Geschiiftsberichte, cited supra note 157 The changing view
within the agency was paralleled in the postwar period by a general change
in German public attitudes in the direction of a greater degree of economic
freedom. One illustration is the recent enactment of an anti-trust law.
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen vom 27 Juli 1957, § 102, in
[1957] Bundesgesetzblatt . 1081, 1100.
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sound, in the sense that a company operating in accordance with
any one of them is safe from risk of insolvency. They vary in
many ways, and it is not important here to describe them in detail.
They all remedy the imbalance between old and new companies,
in greater or lesser measure, by reducing or eliminating the tempo-
rary drain on surplus resulting from the writing of new busi-
ness.160
Thus, implicit in the most abstruse mathematical computations
are policy judgments about the degree to which the value of free-
dom of access to the market is to be given effect. Changes in ac-
tuarial standards inevitably affect the "balance" between compa-
nies. It is most unfortunate that decisions are often made about
actuarial standards on the assumption that they are merely scien-
tific judgments operating without bias. It is interesting to note, in
this connection, that in Sweden there is much discussion at the
present time concerning the competitive implications of different
methods of allocating costs. Insurance people feel keenly the
broader implications of actuarial decisions.
Freedom of access to the market has other dimensions as well.
Mere legal freedom to start a new company means little if a small
group of companies is able to dominate the market and put out-
siders at a disadvantage. Freedom from undue domination of the
market is a value the implementation of which has special im-
portance for the regulation of rate making and of marketing prac-
tices, and in particular for the control of rate bureaus and indus-
try advisory organizations. 161 One further aspect of intrepre-
neurial freedom appears. Concentration of insurance assets in a few
companies might not, in itself, affect seriously the balance of po-
litical and economic power in the modern state. But if the ag-
gregate power of the insurance enterprise were affiliated with the
power of the larger financial institutions, and this combination
were used to dominate industrial corporations, the consequences
could be serious. Fear of the consequences of interlocking direc-
torates between major insurance and banking institutions was one
of the factors leading to the Armstrong and other investigations
and to the resultant reforms. 62 It must be acknowledged that the
impact of insurance practices on the balance of political and eco-
nomic power in our society seems not to be a very pressing prob-
lem in mid-twentieth century, however it may have stood half a
160. See KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 167-70.
161. The current controversy over the standing of the rating bureaus
and their affiliated companies to challenge rate submissions of independent
compames will serve to illustrate this point. See generally Comment, 58
MIcH. L. Rnv. 730-53 (1960) for an able examination of the question.
162. See 10 STATE OF NEW YoRK, TESTIMONY [and REPORT], op. cit.
supra note 23, at 385-89; KMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 133.
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century ago. Nevertheless, freedom of access to the market and pre-
vention of domination of the insurance market and of the finan-
cial and industrial world generally by coalitions of powerful en-
trepreneurs are values which have many consequences for insur-
ance law 163
3 Objectives Related to Capital Accumulation
The level premium basis for life insurance, now all but uni-
versal, results in the aggregation by the life insurance companies
of enormous sums of money to be converted into investments in
business enterprise.'64 The fact that the life insurance company
obligations are largely of long-range and fixed-dollar character
leads to a pattern of investment control which results in extremely
conservative investments, traditionally heavily concentrated in mort-
gages and bonds. Nor are life insurance assets alone in this con-
servative tendency The investments of other insurance compa-
nies, as well as of savings banks and trust companies, lead to
palpable downward pressure on the rate of interest for trustee-
type investments. Not only does any decline in the rate of inter-
est for conservative investments (in comparison with risky invest-
ments) increase the cost of life insurance, but it also encourages
a top-heavy debt structure in the financing of enterprise, with re-
sulting rigidity in the face of economic reverses. No doubt it is easy
to exaggerate the danger and to ignore corrective tendencies au-
tomatically operative in our financial system. Current social pol-
icy demands that legal rules protecting solidity must not unduly
encourage excessive reliance on debt in the financial structure of
enterprise or compel investment in unreasonably unprofitable as-
sets. One of the results of this policy has been a steady liberaliza-
tion for many decades in the investment requirements applicable
to life insurance companies. New powers of investment include
limited powers to invest in common stocks, in income-producing
real estate, and in unrestricted investments. The overwhelming
importance of the objective of solidity has kept the process to a
deliberate pace, but investment powers have expanded inexora-
bly 165
The large capital accumulations of insurance companies bring
yet other policies into play Whenever new social problems re-
163. Notably in investment regulation. See, e.g., N.Y INs. LAW § 85.
164. In 1960, life insurance company assets approached 120 billions
of dollars. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 62.
165. See, e.g., Bell & Frame, Legal Framework, Trends, and Develop-
ments in Investment Practices of Life Insurance Companies, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP PROB. 45-85 (1952), Comment, Statutory Regulation of Life
Insurance Investment, 57 YALE L. J 1256-75 (1948) The history of in-
vestment regulation in Wisconsin is treated in detail in KIMBALL, op, Cit.
supra note 1, at 129-43.
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quiring large capital investment become pressing, insurance assets
appear important as sources from which to draw the funds. Thus,
if insurance compames had not acquired government bonds in
enormous quantities in the early 1940's, it would have been more
difficult to finance the war effort. In 1939, life insurance com-
panies owned five billion dollars m U. S. Government securities,
or about 18 per cent of their assets; m 1946, the amount had in-
creased to nearly 22 billion dollars, or 45 per cent of assets.'10
The liberalization of investment regulation to permit investment in
income-producing real property has helped solve housing prob-
lems born of war and depression. In these circumstances, it was
only partly the need to relax investment rules for the sake of profit
that produced the result; in part the result was produced by the
social need to tap new reservoirs of capital to solve the pressing
housing problems. Similarly, in post-war Germany the social role
of insurance company accumulations has been clearly recognized
in so-called special programs.'17 These basically voluntary ar-
rangements between the life insurance industry and the German
Economics Minister have helped to channel funds into the recon-
struction of dwellings in devastated areas of West Germany and
into the reconstruction of the more vital parts of the German indus-
trial machine. 6 In the more difficult days of reconstruction
there were even compulsory measures such as a capital levy to
help channel capital funds into the areas of most pressing need.'0 9
Thus, to the extent that life insurance assets constitute a major
part of the liquid capital available for new investment in our
economy, the life insurance companies must meet the social needs
or bow to compulsive demands of society in the form of law. It
is in vain to denounce such demands as immoral or as destructive
of freedom of enterprise. The heavy concentration of new capital
in institutional hands ensures that the institutions will frame pol-
icies to meet the social needs, either voluntarily or by compulsion.
166. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 67 De-
pression investments m government bonds were important too. As recently
as 1930, the companies had only 319 million dollars, or 1.7 per cent of
assets thus invested. Ibid.
167. See Verbffentlichungen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes ffir das Versic-
herungs- und Bausparwesen, Geschaftsbencht [1952/53] at 21.
168. See also FRITz, DiE VERMOEGENSAI'LAGEN DER VFRSICHERUNGS-
WIRTACHAFT IN AUFSICHTBEHOERDLICHER SICirT 19-21 (Berlin 1958.)
Day Freie Verm6gen der Lebensverszcherungsgesellschalen, [1958] ZIT-
SCHRIFT FUER VERSICHERUNGSWESEN 155-57.
169. See, e.g., Gesetz ilber die Investitionshilfe der gewerblichen Wirt-
schaft, vom 7. Januar 1952, in [1952] Bundesgesetzblatt 1.7
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C. GENERAL PUBLIC POLICIES-DEMANDS DERIVING FROM
BASIC MORAL VALUES
It is much more difficult to isolate the demands falling under
this rubric, for aside from those so obvious as to be trite, most of
the effects of moral attitudes are very subtle. It will suffice here to
illustrate by three examples the implications for insurance law of
basic moral values.
I Gambling
Insurance is an aleatory contract, with a certain payment on one
side equated to a much larger but uncertain payment on the other
In the gross disparity of amounts and in the uncertainty of pay-
ment it is much akin to gambling. The Anglo-American public
policy that has frowned on gambling contracts in recent centu-
ries.7 has had impact on the insurance institution, helping to
create the doctrine of insurable interest to distinguish permissible
contracts of insurance from illegal wagers. Rationally considered,
the insurable interest doctrine merely provides a way to test wheth-
er an insurance contract has a proper purpose. In borderline
cases, where a decision is difficult to make, it has been important
that a strong moral attitude lay behind the doctrine, giving it in-
tense support. Otherwise there would surely have been a much
stronger inclination to let the parties themselves make the relevant
decisions about the validity of transactions of doubtful purpose.
The same objection to wagering has been one of the factors
leading to the outlawing, in substantially all American states, of
the tontine policy in all its forms. 7'
This moralistic attitude is by no means so strong everywhere,
as is made evident by the combination of insurance with a lottery
in post-war Austria and Spain and by the earlier use of this com-
bination in the Saar 172 The Austrians have explained their use
of the lottery as an effort to bring the propensities of the people
to gamble to aid in the re-establishment of the life insurance in-
situation, after the weakening of popular confidence in it brought
on by the currency depreciation consequent upon two world
wars.' 3 The European Conference of Supervising Services of
Insurance Companies expressed disapproval of the combination
170. The development is summarized in PATTERSON, CASES ON TiE LAW
OF INSURANCE 112-14 (3d ed. 1955)
171. See N.Y INS. LAW § 216; KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at
164-67
172. See Records of the Third European Conference of Supervising
Services of Insurance Companies, Rome, October 1-5, 1956, at pp.
741-47
173. Id. at 746, 963-64.
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in its 1956 meeting, 71 and the German spokesman said that the
proposal had been made often in Germany, too, but had been re-
jected there. 5 A number of other countries specifically prohibit
the junction of lottery and insurance. 176
2. Risk Control and Prevention of Loss
Insurance is mainly concerned with the distribution of risks;
its safe and fair operation does not depend at all upon elimina-
tion or control of risks. A life insurance company can operate as
effectively in a country with bad mortality experience as in one
with good; a fire insurance company can serve as well whether
there are many fires or few. Indeed, from the entrepreneur's point
of view a higher loss rate means more premium income as well as
higher loss payments, and thus a chance of a higher profit on
larger volume. It also means more fear of the threatened loss and
an increased use of insurance.
There is, however, an underlying policy objective of reducing
economic and human waste which operates on the law governing
the insurance institution.
This objective is at once evident in doctrines limiting the ap-
plicability of the insurance institution, particularly in the doctrine
of insurable interest. Part of the thrust of the insurable interest
doctrine is that it limits the sale of insurance to those situations
in which the existence of a contract will not significantly increase
the risk of loss. Thus, incentive to murder is repeatedly said to be
one danger thwarted by the doctrine of insurable interest in life
insurance, and incentive to arson by that doctrine in fire insur-
ance. Likewise, discussions about the valued policy law in Wis-
consin and elsewhere turned largely on the question whether the
existence of such a law increased the likelihood of loss through
carelessness or through deliberate arson.'-,
A wide variety of insurance industry activities, aided and sup-
ported by the law, seek to reduce the economic and human waste
in insurable losses.178 Here it is enough to say that the reduction
or elimination of such loss is a pervasive aim of the law, and that
no consideration of a new proposal in the insurance field is com-
plete without an inquiry into the probable effect of the measure
on the incidence of loss. This is not to say that the effect, even if
it is considerable, is necessarily decisive. Moreover, the effect of
novel proposals on the loss ratio is traditionally exaggerated by
174. Id. at 747
175. Id. at 743.
176. Ibid.
177. KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 240-46.
178. Id. at 288-300.
19611
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 471
insurance men, who tend to rationalize opposition to novel pro-
posals on the basis of danger to the loss ratio. For example, it has
never been shown conclusively that the Wisconsin valued policy
law had any adverse effect on the loss ratio, nor has the showing
been made for comparative negligence statutes." 9 Nevertheless,
insurance men continue to make the assertions. One can regard
a policy of risk control as always relevant, without being influ-
enced too much by facile assertions of drastic effect on the inci-
dence of loss.
3 Avoidance of Corruption
It hardly requires mention that honesty in public and private
life is an explicit policy of the law, reflected in many fields. This
policy has impact on insurance law, too.
Corrupt relationships between insurance company executives
and the New York legislature were among the reasons alleged for
the Armstrong investigation.'80 Squandering of funds for which
there was limited accountability under prevailing reserve laws, if
not downright dishonesty with respect to such funds, was another
reason for the investigation,181 and led to the abolition of the
tontine policy after the investigation was complete.
182
An ever-present problem is the handling of insurance on public
property or activities, for the distribution of the state's purchases
constitutes a natural field for graft and corruption. Such dishon-
esty is not unknown in the distribution of the public insurance
business.' 83 Possible solutions to the problem, aside from closer
policing, are creation of a state insurance fund to provide the in-
surance, and development of a plan for distributing the business so
widely that all incentive to corruption is eliminated."8
CONCLUSION
In the United States and Germany, and to a lesser but consider-
able extent in many other countries, insurance is subject to close
regulation. Interference with free activity in the insurance market
is especially noteworthy in a business which is highly competitive,
which is generally well-run along conservative lines, and which
presents no striking problems of domination of economic life or
subversion of political processes. It is perhaps not easy to justify
179 Id. at 242; Peck, Compartive Negligence and Automobile Liability
Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REv 689 (1960) No doubt the frequent assertions
about the effect of direct action statutes are equally incapable of proof.
180. MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 462 (4th ed. 1955)
181. Ibid.
182. Id. at 463.
183. See KIMBALL & CONKLIN, Op. cit. supra note 47, at 67-71.
184. Id. at 71.
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such extensive regulation, at least in comparison with the freedom
enjoyed by most other businesses of similar importance. If one
seeks reasons, he is told that the parties to an insurance contract
are not negotiators of equal weight in the marketplace, that insur-
ance is an exceedingly complicated business selling a product
which is difficult for its votaries to understand and impossible for
most of its buyers, that the contract has long duration in many
instances, that the uncertain payment coming at the end of the
long delay is likely to be of crucial importance in the life of the
policyholder. Although all of these things are true, it must be
conceded that each of them is true of some other businesses as
well. However, there is -probably no other business to which so
many of these characteristics apply in such large measure, and
perhaps in the aggregate these factors justify the deep-probing
supervisory activities of the modem insurance department.
All of these factors are in reality variations of the first, the
disparity in bargaining power. This suggests that regulation
exists to protect the weaker contracting party. It is not surprising,
therefore, that marine and transport insurance and reinsurance
have generally been subjected to much less control than other
lines of insurance, for here the insurance buyer is likely to be as
large as the seller, as expert, and as adept in the marketplace.
While protection of the weaker of two contracting parties ex-
plains the intervention of the state in the insurance transaction, it
does not explain the myriad forms taken by that intervention. Be-
ginning with the most obvious, the requirement of solidity is im-
posed because without it the business does not work at all, does
not insure. This purpose is the first to be perceived after the de-
cision has been made for government intervention; indeed, threats
to solidity were the ratson-d'etre of the early insurance depart-
ments. Once intervention has begun, new purposes begin to
emerge, and the goals of reasonableness, equity, and fairness
become explicit. Finally, as the insurance enterprise becomes
more and more crucial to the social fabric and as regulation ac-
quires more sophistication, the manifold purposes of society at
large come to have more and more implications for the pro-
cesses of insurance regulation.
There is nothing inevitable about the growth of insurance regu-
lation from a. simple focus on the solidity of the enterprise to a
wide-ranging concern for many purposes. English regulation, for
example, seems to have gone little beyond the purpose of solidity.
Clearly, in the case of England this reflects neither an unde-
veloped state of the insurance enterprise nor an undeveloped sense
of responsibility for the welfare of the people. In part it reflects
a greater emphasis than we place on certain of the objectives we
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have described, for the objectives are not all consistent with one
another. In part it may reflect also an entirely different pattern
of solutions which seek and achieve roughly the same ends. Thus
the ease of access of new entrepreneurs into the American insur-
ance market presents the American insurance departments with
difficult problems of control-problems that do not exist in the
English market, where few new companies are formed. Moreover,
there is said to be a quality of sober restraint in English economic
life that may make various kinds of regulation less necessary than
here. Another relevant factor is the degree of self-regulation of
the business. One may justifiably suggest as a hypothesis that the
English pattern of regulation seeks the same goals as the Ameri-
can, but that the English social and governmental structure per-
mits it to achieve the same goals with a lesser expenditure of effort
than does ours. This would not be the first time that English
society had managed to do a large job with a small investment in
central government machinery In its early centuries, the royal ju-
dicial machinery in England operated quite successfully with an
investment in judicial manpower that was a mere tithe of that
used on the continent of Europe." Before one concludes that
the English are less effective in achieving most of the goals we
have described, or are uninterested in some of them, one needs to
make a close comparison between the English insurance system
and the American or German systems-and in considerable
depth. The differences one thinks he perceives between the pur-
poses of English insurance supervision and those of either Ameri-
can or German supervision may be more apparent than real. The
difference may instead be a difference in the extent of the need for
particular governmental controls. But this question requires much
exploration before one can venture an answer
It is usually assumed that the purpose of insurance regulation is
single and simple. In reality it is neither There are many purposes,
and they are in considerable conflict with one another. Insur-
ance is a small world that reflects the purposes of the larger world
outside it. It is not easy, therefore, to state a theory of insurance
regulation in which every activity will neatly fit. Perhaps it is
even impossible. It seems likely, however, that more attention di-
rected to the purposes of insurance regulation would illuminate
the field and render it more meaningful, not by making it simple
but by explaining the objectives in all of their complex inter-
action and in all of their conflict. Only thus can a theory of insur-
ance regulation be developed as a meaningful guide to practical,
everyday activities in the insurance departments of the world.
185. See DAWSON, THE HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 69-72 (1960)
